Multilateral agricultural trade liberalization: The contrasting fortunes of developing countries in the Doha Round by Jean-Christophe Bureau & Antoine Bouet, Yvan Decreux, Sébastien Jean
IIIS Discussion Paper  
No.60 / January 2005
Multilateral agricultural trade liberalization:



















Multilateral agricultural trade liberalization: 



















   
 
    Disclaimer 
   Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of the IIIS. 
   All works posted here are owned and copyrighted by the author(s).   











Multilateral agricultural trade liberalization: 




Draft. This version: 19 Nov 2004  
 
 
Antoine BOUET (CATT/UPPA and CEPII) 
Jean-Christophe BUREAU (IIIS, Trinity College Dublin and INAPG) 
Yvan DECREUX (CEPII) 










We thank Alan Matthews, John Beghin, Tim Josling, Alex Gohin and Stephen Tokarick for valuable comments on 
earlier versions. The database has benefited from numerous contributions during its development, including 
contributions from UNCTAD, from many members of the GTAP consortium, researchers from Purdue University, 
from the Economic Research Service of the US Department of agriculture, from the FOI in Copenhagen and the 







Contact: J.Christophe BUREAU,The Institute for International Integration Studies, The Sutherland Centre, Arts 
Building Trinity College Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland Tel: +353 1 608 31 96, Email: bureauj@tcd.ie  
 




Multilateral agricultural trade liberalization: 
 
The contrasting fortunes of developing countries in the Doha Round 
 
 
Abstract:  An applied general equilibrium model is used to assess the impact of multilateral trade 
liberalization in agriculture, with particular emphasis on developing countries.  We use original 
data, and the model includes some specific features such as a dual labor market.  Applied tariffs, 
including those under preferential regimes and regional agreements, are taken into account at the 
detailed product level, together with the corresponding bound tariffs on which countries 
negotiate.  The various types of farm support are detailed, and several groups of developing 
countries are distinguished.  Simulations give a contrasted picture of the benefits developing 
countries would draw from the Doha development round.  The results suggest that previous 
studies that have neglected preferential agreements and the binding overhang (in tariffs as well as 
domestic support), and have treated developed countries with a high level of aggregation have 
been excessively optimistic about the actual benefits of multilateral trade liberalization.  Regions 
like sub-Saharan Africa are more likely to suffer from the erosion of existing preferences.  The 
main gainers of the Doha round are likely to be developed countries and Cairns group members.  
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Multilateral agricultural trade liberalization: 
 
The contrasting fortunes of developing countries in the Doha Round 
 
Introduction 
The agricultural sector has been one of the most contentious issues in the multilateral trade 
negotiations that have been taking place since 1999.  Discussions on agriculture have delayed the 
conclusion of the so-called "Doha Round" of negotiations under the auspices of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), launched by the 2001 Ministerial Declaration.  After 13 major meetings, 
some 45 proposals and submissions from 127 countries, members failed to agree on numerical 
targets, formulas and other "modalities" on the agricultural sector before the scheduled deadlines.  
It is only in July 2004 that an agreement was found on some general principles.  However, crucial 
technical aspects, such as the exact degree of tariff reduction (bands and thresholds) and the level 
of cuts in distorting farm support have been left to future negotiation.  
During these long drawn out negotiations, developing countries (hereafter DCs) have emerged as 
a significant political force.  They built a united front to oppose an agreement during the 2003 
Ministerial Cancun meeting.  Since then, they have vehemently criticized the farm policies and 
agricultural tariffs in developed countries.  During the year 2004, DCs have extracted some 
concessions from developed countries, namely the (conditional) ending of European Union (EU) 
export subsidies, and the promise that significant cuts will take place for highly protective tariffs.  
They also secured agreement that issues of particular interest for them, like cotton, would be 
examined. 
Several assessments of the effect of an agricultural agreement in the Doha Round have been 
published during the last years.  Most simulations with Applied General Equilibrium (AGE) 
models have concluded that developing countries would reap large benefits from agricultural 
trade liberalization.  The World Bank, in particular, makes a strong case for the large gains that 
developing countries would draw from an agreement on agriculture.  However, we believe that 
there are several reasons why many AGE simulations have been excessively optimistic in this 
area, and that general conclusions might have been drawn on the basis of models that rely on 
insufficiently detailed data.  In this article, we assess the impact of the Doha agreement, with a 
particular focus on three aspects that are, in our opinion, the weak points of most existing models: 
(i) a precise measurement of protection, including trade preferences, regional agreements, and the 
gap between applied and bound protection, at a disaggregated product level; (ii) a precise 
accounting of the complex effects of the various types of domestic support; (iii) a distinction 
between the various groups of DCs.  
We first explain why we believe that many assessments of multilateral negotiations using AGE 
models have lead to questionable conclusions regarding the effect of an agricultural agreement on 
DCs.  We then describe the main features of our model.  We focus on the differences with other 
models, on experiment design, and on the baseline assumptions.  We describe the data, in 
particular our original treatment of tariff protection.  In a second part of the article, we present the 
results of our simulations of the August 2004 agreement, using figures from the last draft 
compromise available for issues still under negotiation.  We then provide some explanations for 
the results and undertake some sensitivity analysis.  Introducing better protection data, 
accounting for quota rents, distinguishing the multiple forms of agricultural support, and using a   2 
 
careful measurement of the actual impact of posted liberalization lead to conclusions that differ 
from the ones often reached by AGE modelers, regarding the impact of agricultural trade 
liberalization on DCs. 
 
AGE models and WTO negotiations 
AGE models were extensively used to assess the impact of trade negotiations during the Uruguay 
Round, with a particular effort by researchers working in international organizations, like the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (hereafter OECD).  The 
consequences of the Round for developing countries were given particular attention (Goldin and 
Knudsen; Martin and Winters).  The Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) made possible a 
dramatic expansion of AGE-based approaches (Hertel).  For several years, AGE models have 
been at the core of the economic assessments of the Doha Round negotiations (see Beghin, 
Roland-Host and Van der Mensbrugghe; Diao, Somwaru and Roe; Francois, van Meijl and van 
Tongeren; Frandsen et al. for example). 
Obviously, not all models lead to similar results regarding the effect of a WTO agreement.  
However, most simulations conducted with AGE models suggest that DCs will be major gainers 
under a Doha agreement (see Hertel, Hoekman and Martin; Goldin, Knudsen and van der 
Mensbrugghe, for example).  According to some simulations, DCs would reap two thirds of the 
500 billion USD gains generated by ambitious trade liberalization in the agricultural sector (The 
World Bank).  We believe that several limitations of the models used mean these conclusions 
must be questioned. 
Acknowledging DCs diversity. First, general conclusions about DCs as a whole could be 
misleading, and the impact of the Doha Round on these countries is likely to be uneven.  With the 
ending of export subsidies and a decrease in tariffs and production enhancing subsidies, world 
agricultural prices are likely to go up.  Higher prices and better access to agricultural markets in 
developed countries should benefit DCs, whose comparative advantages often lie in agriculture.  
However, not all DCs are net exporters of agricultural products.  Not all net food-importing 
countries have the capacity to increase significantly their production, should unfair competition 
and subsidies be eliminated in OECD countries.  In such cases, trade liberalization will mainly 
increase the food import bill.  A multilateral agreement on agriculture will also have contrasted 
effects because some DCs export products subject to a high level of distorting support or to tariff 
peaks in OECD countries or in India and China (sugar, beef, cotton, groundnuts).  Other DCs 
export products whose markets are much less distorted (coffee, cocoa, fish) and will gain less. 
Erosion of preferences and trade diversion. The preferences granted either under preferential 
regimes linked to economic development criteria (e.g. the General System of Preferences or GSP, 
or the specific regimes offered to Least Developed Countries – LDCs- by most OECD countries) 
or on a geographical basis (e.g. the EU Lomé/Cotonou agreements, the US Africa Growth 
Opportunity Act, the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act) are of considerable importance 
for some countries (see OECD).  This is particularly the case for some small and highly 
specialized economies, which have developed specific agricultural sectors under a preferential 
access to the EU or US market.  The ending of these preferences, or even the erosion of the 
preferential margins which would follow a multilateral decrease in tariffs, may have a significant 
negative impact.  Some DCs might lose some markets to the benefit of developed countries such   3 
 
as Australia or New Zealand, or other DCs such as Brazil.  To our knowledge, however, no AGE 
assessment of multilateral liberalization has so far fully accounted for preferential regimes (the 
recent work on Africa by Achterbosch,, Ben Hamouda,, Osakwe and van Tongeren, 2004, is an 
exception).  Due to the difficulty of gathering the relevant information, only a few agreements are 
generally accounted for.  
Posted vs. actual liberalization. Many AGE models rely on crude assumptions on the level of 
protection and domestic support.  It is often ignored that many countries apply tariffs that are 
only a fraction of their bound tariffs (often one third of the level of bound tariffs in DCs, see 
Gibson et al.).  As multilateral tariff reductions are made on the basis of bound tariffs, the actual 
impact of a tariff cut will often be overestimated.
1  Reductions in farm support are negotiated on 
the basis of a maximum Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS), an indicator that combines 
estimates of the production distorting support paid by taxpayers and consumers.  In the EU, for 
example, the actual AMS as notified to the WTO, is only a fraction of the ceiling on which 
countries negotiate reductions, and the recent EU policy reforms will soon reduce the actual AMS 
to a very small figure.  That is, cuts in distorting support decided during the Doha Round will 
result in only a small change in the actual level of EU support.  Again, ignoring the gap between 
the figures used in the negotiation and the actual figures can lead to misleading results.
2 
In the present article, we attempt to improve on existing models by addressing these issues.  The 
model that we use shares some general features of other AGE models (e.g. some recent versions 
of the GTAP model including imperfect competition, or the LINKAGE model, see Hertel or Van 
der Mensbrugghe, respectively).  It contains some specific aspects, such as product differentiation 
and increasing returns to scale in some sectors, endogenous land supply in some countries and a 
dual labor market in developing countries.  Agricultural policies (including output quotas, market 
price support measures, and expenditure ceilings) are explicitly modeled, and consistency is 
ensured between intervention prices, export subsidies and tariffs.  However, the major 
improvements are in the area of data on protection, a precise representation of the various forms 
of farm support, and scenarios that account for the existing gap between negotiated trade 
liberalization and actual changes. 
 
Model and data 
Main characteristics of the model.  The model used in this article is a multi-sector, multi-region 
general equilibrium model. While sharing basic features with the MIRAGE model (described in 
Bchir et al.), it has been developed specifically to assess the consequences of agricultural trade 
liberalization.  The model distinguishes 30 sectors (including 23 agricultural and food sectors) 
and 11 country groups.  In particular, large agricultural exporters (developing members of the 
Cairns group) and sub-Saharan Africa are distinguished.  All agricultural sectors are perfectly 
competitive, but industrial (including food) sectors and services are not.  Imperfect competition is 
                                                 
1 Another source of overstatement of actual liberalization is the overstatement of initial protection, when not yet 
implemented commitments (such as those under the URAA for DCs, or those under the accession package for 
newly-acceded WTO members) are not taken into account, as is usually the case.  
2 Note that in addition, modelers do not always make allowance for blue box exemptions and de minimis payments 
when modeling cuts in support.   4 
 
represented with an oligopolistic framework à la Cournot.  It accounts for horizontal product 
differentiation linked to varieties, but also to geographical origin (nested Armington – Dixit-
Stiglitz utility function).  Some degree of vertical product differentiation is introduced in 
industrial sectors, by distinguishing two quality ranges, according to the country of origin of the 
product. (This is not the case, however, for agricultural commodities). 
Although MIRAGE is a dynamic and sequential model, here, we present only static comparative 
simulations.  The impact of some of our contributions (e.g. applied tariffs, detailed farm policy 
instruments, actual reductions, etc.) should appear more clearly than with a dynamic version 
which would have taken us further away from a ceteris paribus comparison with other studies. 
Capital stock is assumed to be perfectly mobile across sectors and we ignore foreign direct 
investment.  In terms of macro-economic closure, investment is savings-driven, and the current 
balance is assumed to be exogenous.  In the simulations presented here, we also ignore the 
possible impact of trade policy on economy-wide capital stock (through income or the rate of 
return to capital in the dynamic version of the model).  Land supply behaves as an isoelastic 
function of the real return to land (van der Mensbrugghe).  Regions are accordingly classified 
either as land-constrained or not, and different values of supply elasticities are assumed.
3  Land 
mobility across agricultural sector is assumed to be imperfect. 
All developing countries are assumed to have dual economies, with an urban market that is 
distinct from a "traditional" market in rural areas (Lewis; Harris and Todaro).  The modern sector 
(industry and services) pays an efficiency wage to unskilled workers, above their marginal 
productivity.  It is thus faced with a totally elastic supply of unskilled labor.  The primary sector 
(i.e., agriculture), in contrast, pays a competitive wage.  The supply of unskilled labor available 
for the primary sector is set as a residual, once the "modern" sector has set its unskilled labor 
employment level.  The specification provides a simple way to account for a hidden 
unemployment in developing countries, and to depart from the standard assumption of balanced 
labor markets used in AGE models, in spite of its obvious inappropriateness in the DCs case.  In 
all countries, labor is imperfectly mobile between agricultural activities and other sectors, and 
substitution is represented by a Constant Elasticity of Transformation function.  
Some original contributions to the modeling of agricultural trade liberalization. While the 
general architecture of the model remains relatively standard, compared to recent efforts in AGE 
modeling (with the exception, of the dual labor market assumption), we introduce some major 
improvements in the data and the treatment of agricultural policies.  As in many other models, we 
use the GTAP database for accounting matrices, trade costs and non-farm policies (Dimaranan 
and MacDougall).  However, our protection data and data on farm support rely on original work.  
Here, tariff protection relies on applied tariffs.  A special database was developed in collaboration 
with the International Trade Commission (ITC), the MAcMap dataset.
4  The exact methodology 
is described in Bouët et al., 2004.  MAcMap provides ad valorem tariffs, and estimates of the ad 
                                                 
3 The values of the elasticities are similar to those used in the LINKAGE model, i.e. 0.25 for land constrained 
countries and 1 for other countries. We thank Dominique van der Mensbrugghe for providing us information and 
advice on this point.  The transformation elasticity of land mobility across sectors is set to 0.5. 
4 The MacMap data on protection developed for this article will be used in future versions of the GTAP database 
(version 6).  These data have been reviewed carefully by the 28 institutions members of the GTAP Consortium. They 
have identified many errors in earlier versions and their suggestions have improved dramatically the data used in this 
paper. We acknowledge the considerable contribution of GTAP consortium members and researchers in Purdue 
University.   5 
 
valorem equivalents of specific tariffs and tariff quotas (based on the in or out of quota tariff, 
depending on which one is binding).  Tariff quota rents are also computed, for those quotas that 
are filled, and are assumed to be kept by exporters
5.  The information is put together at the 
bilateral level, for 163 countries with 208 partners.  All preferential agreements, including those 
of the EU, are taken into account.  This information was put together at the six-digit level of the 
Harmonized System (HS) of classification (hereafter HS6), i.e. for 5,111 goods.  The aggregation 
procedure uses weights based on the exports of each partner country to a reference group of 
countries which the importer belongs to, in order to avoid the well-known endogeneity bias that 
affects import-weighted average tariffs.
6  The bilateral matrices at the HS6 level make it possible 
to account for country specific aggregate tariffs, and for country specific aggregate tariff 
reductions.  A change in the EU vector of bound tariffs, for example, will have a different impact 
on different countries because not all products are eligible to the same preferences.  In addition, a 
given multilateral reduction in a bound tariff will result in a different change in the applied tariff 
across countries, because, for each product, the margin between bound and applied tariffs differs. 
Another contribution is the data for agriculture in OECD countries.  Here we build on existing 
work on the modeling of agricultural policy (Frandsen, Gerfeldt and Jensen; Burfisher, Robinson 
and Thierfelder) and we developed a precise representation of EU, US, Canadian and Japanese 
farm support.  Information on farm policies at a very detailed level is used so as to take into 
account the actual effect of each payment.  Subsidies are introduced as price wedges, either on 
output, on variable inputs, on land or on capital.  Market price support is explicitly modeled, 
through the combination of tariffs and of export subsidies.  The WTO ceilings cap the 
corresponding export subsidies, and reaching the ceiling entails an endogenous adjustment of the 
market price that can be supported.  Production quotas are also explicitly modeled, and originate 
rents.  Some of the (semi-decoupled) EU direct payments are treated as subsidies to the animal 
capital.  Some others are treated as subsidies to land.  The fully decoupled ones are treated as a 
return to self-employed labor and have therefore an indirect effect on production, by pulling some 
of the primary factor into the sector, reflecting that no payment is fully decoupled in agriculture.  
Set-aside is taken into account in the US and the EU, and modeled as a negative shock on the 
productivity of land (Bach and Frandsen).  The original information is mainly based on the data 
compiled by the OECD for the calculation of the Producer support estimates (Additional data for 
non-standard commodities were provided by the OECD Secretariat and national sources).  The 
effect of the EU enlargement, of a full implementation of the Agenda 2000 reform in the EU 
including the June 2003 Mid Term Review reforms, and of the 2002 US Farm Security and Rural 
Investment (FSRI) Act in the US, are taken into account.  
                                                 
5 This assumption is an extreme one, but in the absence of precise information on the sharing of the rent, it seemed 
more appropriate for a set of large quotas (EU sugar and bananas) than the other extreme assumption, that rents are 
captured by the importer.  Note that there are cases where the method of administrating TRQs (e.g. auction) makes 
this assumption is hardly defendable.  More generally, in the case of certain preferences (e.g. GSP), it is not clear that 
exporters get the benefits because of the way import licences are administered. 
6 Because of the negative correlation between tariffs and imports, trade weighted average tariffs underestimate true 
measures of protection (see Anderson and Neary).  The bias is obvious for the Canadian dairy sector or the Japanese 
rice sector, where prohibitive tariffs result in a zero weight, leading to a very small aggregate tariff.  The use of 
imports of a reference group of countries avoids endogeneity bias and provides a better approximation of 
theoretically consistent tariffs. (Note however, while the MAcMap dataset on protection is the basis for the future 
GTAP data, aggregation in GTAP 6 will not use a reference group but simple trade weighted aggregation.  One 
reason for this decision by the Consortium is that many users do not focus on precise measurement of protection but 
need to maintain a direct link between tariffs and tariffs revenues to remain consistent with national accounting).   6 
 
Experiment design. We established both a baseline and a trade liberalization scenario that is used 
to shock the baseline equilibrium.  While it is intended to represent a mid-term reference point 
which the changes brought about by a Doha agreement can be compared to, the baseline is a 
somewhat fictitious situation.  It corresponds to the situation as it was in 2001 (the last year for 
which the required data were available), but assuming that the EU enlargement has taken place 
and that the EU and US recent changes in farm policies are fully implemented.  This avoids using 
forecast data originating from other models, while making it possible to account for the recent 
changes in agricultural policies.  Such changes are important since, in the EU, they introduce 
some budget caps that restrict market intervention and therefore on price support.  In brief, the 
baseline equilibrium is obtained as a result of pre-experiment simulation where the raw data 
(MAcMap_HS6 for protection including the EU Everything but arms initiative and the US Africa 
Growth Opportunity Act; GTAP version 5.3 for other data), is shocked by assuming that the 2003 
US farm policy and the 2006 EU farm policy are in place; the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture commitments are fully implemented by DCs; newly acceded WTO members (among 
which China) enter the WTO and implements the corresponding commitments made in terms of 
bound protection; and the Multi-Fiber Arrangement is phased out.  This baseline is the reference 
point to which our scenario of agricultural trade liberalization will be compared. 
WTO countries agreed on liberalizing agricultural trade in August 2004 (WTO, 2004).  However, 
the agreement leaves many technical issues to further negotiations.  The only precise 
commitment is the ending of export subsidies on a date that is not specified.  In the area of 
market access, there is a commitment to using a tiered formula, with deeper cuts in higher tariffs 
and "flexibilities" for sensitive products.  However, the number of bands, the thresholds for 
defining the bands and the tariff reduction in each band remain under negotiation.  In the 
domestic support area, an element of harmonization will in principle be introduced, meaning that 
higher levels of permitted trade-distorting support policies will be subject to deeper cuts.  Thus, 
there is little precise information on what will be the actual technical modalities, and at this point, 
a scenario must be elaborated.  The last proposal in the Doha round containing precise 
commitments is the draft compromise of March 2003 (WTO, 2003).  It failed to attract a 
consensus.  Later proposals such as the one discussed in the 2003 Cancun ministerial meeting 
may take better into account the evolution in negotiating positions but contain no precise 
quantification.  In addition, if one analyzes the various country proposals submitted between 
2001 and 2003, the technical provisions included in WTO (2003) appear close to the center of 
gravity of country proposals regarding domestic support, tariff bands and tariff reductions.  In our 
scenario, we therefore use the March 2003 proposal to fill the grey areas that have been left by 
the August 2004 Decision on technical aspects, such as cuts in tariffs and reduction in the AMS 
ceiling.  The tariff bands and reductions that are used in the scenario range from a 40% cut for 
small tariffs (those less than 15% ad valorem) to a 60% cut in high tariffs (those larger than 90%, 
see WTO, 2003).  We assumed that the reduction in tariffs will be less constraining for 
developing countries, along the lines of the March 2003 proposal, and consistent with the 
principle of Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) outlined in the August 2004 declaration.  
Our scenario also includes the end of export subsidies and a cut of 55% in the various elements of 
support linked to output and inputs.
 7  
                                                 
7 Here, we considered that "distorting" support included support coupled to production, as measured by the AMS and 
blue box payments.  We also included payments notified by the US under the "de minimis clause" (this clause states 
that some payments do not have to be counted against the AMS if they amount to a small fraction of the value of 
production, but in the recent years, it was used by the US which would have otherwise exceeded the AMS ceiling).   7 
 
Initial protection patterns. In the baseline, the thirty matrices of 11x11 average tariffs are 
constructed on the basis of applied tariffs, i.e. taking into account the gap that may exist between 
bound and actual most favored nation tariffs, tariff quotas, free trade areas and preferential 
regimes.  Average tariffs for an aggregate of all sectors are presented in table 1.  The figures refer 
to the average tariff imposed by the importer (column) to each supplier (row).
   The last row 
indicates the average agricultural protection by importing zone and the last column the average 
tariff faced by the supplier’s aggregate exports. 
[Insert table 1] 
Table 1 shows that the agricultural sector is very protected in some countries, even when 
preferential regimes are taken into account.  For example, the average tariff on agricultural goods 
imposed by EFTA countries is 47.7%, the one imposed by the EU is 16.7%.  Note that the EU 
figure is smaller than the one that is found in most studies (e.g. Gibson et al.) and the present 
GTAP database.  The reason is that the EU grants significant preferences to sub-Saharan Africa, 
EFTA and Mediterranean countries.  These preferences result in a much lower average EU tariff 
applied to sub-Saharan exports (6.7%) than to the exports originating from the developed 
members of the Cairns group (25.9%).  US preferences, including the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, and non-reciprocal preferences (the GSP) are also taken into account. Figures in 
table 1 show that there are some significant preferential margins, which would be eroded by a 
multilateral reduction in bound tariffs.  
Sub-Saharan Africa faces the lowest level of protection against its agro-food exports (10.2%).  
Agricultural exports from the developed members of the Cairns group, for instance, are subject to 
a much higher average tariff (21.2%).  The differences between these two figures reflect both the 
existence of preferences granted to African countries, and the composition of exports: Cairns 
group countries indeed export products that face high tariffs in OECD countries (such as beef, 
sugar or dairy), while sub-Saharan Africa exports large amounts of coffee, cocoa, and flowers, 
that face lower tariffs.  
Broadly speaking, protection is often considerable in the sugar, meat, cereal and dairy sectors.
8  
The highest duties are the ones imposed on rice by the group of Asian developed countries.  It is 
noteworthy that there is sometimes a significant degree of protection of the processing sector: 
trade in fibers are nearly free, while trade on processed cotton and apparels face high tariffs in 
many countries. 
The Doha agreement scenario: effects on protection. In our scenario, the cuts for the different 
tariff bands described in WTO (2003) are applied to the bound tariffs.  But in the changes applied 
to our baseline matrices of tariffs, the new level of bound tariffs only becomes the applied tariff if 
the new bound level is lower than the initial applied tariff.  The procedure is applied to all 
bilateral tariffs at the HS6 level.  The new vectors of tariffs obtained are then aggregated in the 
model classification.  The ad valorem equivalent of bound duties at the HS6 level was 
constructed, using each country’s consolidated tariff schedule, in a way consistent with that used 
for measuring applied protection in MAcMap.
9  This computation of resulting applied tariff cuts 
thus contrasts with existing studies by making it possible to take into account the gap between 
                                                 
8 Protection data at the sector level are available from the authors upon request.  
9 We used data kindly provided by John Wainio and Paul Gibson, from the Economic Research Service of the USDA 
to complement the MAcMap data on bound tariffs.   8 
 
bound and applied tariffs at a detailed level, while also allowing the harmonizing effect of the 
formula to be accurately reflected.  In addition, out-of-quota tariff cuts are reflected in lowered 
TRQ rents. 
Table 2 shows the resulting changes in applied tariffs (change in percentage points) imposed by 
each group on imports of agricultural and food products from each partner group.  The last line 
indicates the change in average protection in each group of importing countries.  The last column 
shows the changes in market access faced by each group of exporting countries.  For example, 
our Doha agreement scenario leads to a reduction of 2.9 percentage points in applied agricultural 
tariffs of EFTA, of 7.1 points in the EU25, and of 0.8 points in the US.  While initial tariffs were 
also high, SDT and the fact that there was a very large degree of so-called "binding overhang" 
(i.e. bound tariffs were higher than applied tariffs) result in limited changes for DCs.  In table 2, 
the last column shows that sub-Saharan countries is one of the regions that benefits least from the 
opening of markets, both because of its export structure (cocoa, coffee face low tariffs) and 
because of the preferential regimes.  The average tariff faced by sub-Saharan agricultural exports 
only decreases by 2.2 percentage points.  By contrast, the cut amounts to 4.6 percentage points 
for developing members of the Cairns group.  This suggests that, among DCs, multilateral 
liberalization opens markets for Argentina and Brazil exports more than for Mediterranean and 
African countries.  Moreover, table 2 shows that the greatest beneficiaries, from a mercantilistic 
point of view, are developed countries.  The developed members of the Cairns group face an 
average tariff that decreases by 6.4 percentage points.  The tariff cuts for EU and US exports also 
exceed the cuts for DCs, in percentage points. Despite a very high initial protection, applying the 
March 2003 formula does not entail a large openness of EFTA due to a binding overhang 
phenomenon. 
[Insert table 2 and table 3] 
Table 3 shows changes in the average tariff protection faced by each country group’s exports by 
sector, in percentage points.  A tiered formula cut in import duties would result in large market 
access improvements in rice (Developed Asia) and sugar (EU, Developed Asia).  
 
Simulation results 
The simulation consists of a shock to the baseline using our Doha Agreement scenario, i.e. the 
changes in tariffs described in the previous section, as well as the suppression of export subsidies 
and the cut in trade distorting domestic support.  The model ensures consistency between various 
policies.  In some cases, this requires making endogenous changes in policy variables.  For 
example, the suppression of export subsidies and the cut in tariffs make some EU intervention 
price levels unsustainable (leading to unrealistic levels of inventories and exceeding the EU 
agricultural budget constraint agreed upon in 2003).  In such a case of unbalanced domestic 
markets, the intervention price, which normally acts as a floor price for the producer in the 
model, is assumed to be adjusted by EU authorities, and becomes an endogenous variable.  In the 
case of tariff rate quotas, the rent associated with the gap between the in and out-of-quota tariffs 
is positive only if the quota is filled by calculated imports. 
The combination of changes to the three pillars, domestic support, border protection and export 
competition, leads to a consistent scenario.  In the following tables, the figures correspond to an 
assessment of the effects of the three pillars independently, and the last column the combination   9 
 
of the three, i.e. the changes brought by a Doha agreement to a mid-term reference situation 
represented by our baseline. 
World prices. The first expected impact of a multilateral liberalization is an increase in world 
prices.  Ceteris paribus, removing protection should decrease export surpluses or increase import 
demand in protective countries and therefore push world prices up.  So do cuts in production 
support and the removal of exports subsidies.  Indeed, table 4 shows that world agricultural prices 
will increase.  In the case of rice, cotton, and to a lesser extent oilseeds and cereals, the main 
source of the increase is the removal of domestic support.  In the case of sugar, it is the ending of 
(EU) export subsidies.  In the fruits and vegetable as well as in the beverage sector, the main 
source is the decrease in tariffs.  Overall, the increase in world price is significant in the fibers 
sector (cotton), and significant in the rice and oilseed sector. In other cases, the increase in world 
prices is limited.
10  
[Insert table 4] 
Quantities traded. Table 5 suggests that, overall, the quantities of agricultural products traded 
internationally will grow by some 6%.  The main driving force is the decrease in tariffs.  The 
suppression of export subsidies only has a limited effect.  One reason is that EU export subsidies 
have already decreased dramatically since the late 1990s, and this was taken into account in the 
baseline.  In some cases, such as the US (cotton) and the EU (sugar), the Doha agreement will 
result in a significant decrease in some exports after domestic or export subsidies are cut, but it is 
offset by an increase in the exports of some other products due to improved market access in third 
countries.  This is not the case for EFTA countries.  The decrease in tariffs results in a significant 
increase in exports of Cairns group countries and China.  Mediterranean countries’ exports of 
agricultural products also increase in spite of the erosion of their (very limited) preferential 
access to the EU (note, however, that they experience a fall in exports of non agricultural 
products such as garments). Sub Saharan Africa countries experience a smaller increase in 
exports than most other developing countries. This results mainly from the erosion of preferences 
on the EU’s market.  As a general rule, exports of the poorest countries (sub-Saharan Africa and 
South Asia, which includes most LDCs, plus India) increase significantly less than the average 
exports of the rest of the world. 
[Insert table 5] 
If we now focus on the effect of the Doha agreement on net trade, the increase in imports exceeds 
the increase in exports in the case of developed countries in Asia and Europe. The trade balance 
for agricultural products worsens in the case of Japan and Western Europe.  The growth in 
imports also offsets the growth in exports in the case of China and South Asian countries. The 
trade balance of Cairns group countries, especially that of the developed members, increases a lot 
(imports grow by 3% and exports by 13%). 
Terms of trade. Our Doha agreement agricultural scenario results in significant terms of trade 
variations.  The Cairns group developing countries terms of trade improve.  So do the terms of 
                                                 
10 The case of sugar, whose world prices show a slight decrease following a reduction in tariffs reflects the way the 
we measured world prices, i.e. as import prices. Sugar is subject to a tariff quota in the EUTRQs: The decrease in 
out-of-quota tariffs lowers the rent, which is assumed to be kept by the exporting country and treated as an increase 
in import prices.   10 
 
trade of sub-Saharan Africa.  Among developing countries, the role of cotton appears significant 
in explaining changes in terms of trade.  The cotton price is a major driving force of the improved 
terms of trade of sub-Saharan Africa, but also the deterioration of terms of trade in Mediterranean 
countries, which are large importers of cotton.  This finding illustrates the importance of the 
cotton issue for DCs, and provides some justification for the specific negotiation on cotton, a 
commitment of WTO members in the July 2004 agreement. 
Welfare. Table 6 shows the impact of a Doha agreement on agriculture in terms of welfare.  
Overall, the changes in welfare are small.  Basically, the agreement on agriculture that was 
reached in August 2004 would lead to a mere 0.1 percent increase in world welfare. The fact that 
the actual outcome of the negotiations on technical modalities might differ from our scenario is 
unlikely to change the magnitude of this result.  On the opposite, the fact that some "sensitive 
products", i.e. those where most of the existing distortions are concentrated, are likely to be 
excluded from the discipline, suggest that our small figure might even be optimistic. 
[Insert table 6] 
Countries that reduce their own domestic distortions are the main gainers in the agreement. This 
is clearly the case for the US (provided that the domestic support is reduced by as much as 
included in our scenario.  It is also the case of the EU, of developed Asia and EFTA if the 
agreement on tariff cuts is close to the one we included in our scenario, that is if these countries 
do not make a large use of the provisions for "sensitive products" of the August 2004 
Declaration.  In all these cases, most gains are linked to an improved efficiency of resource 
allocation.  The impact of ending export subsidies is quite small, again reflecting that the recent 
changes in the CAP have already led to a decrease in domestic price and a decrease in 
production.  A second category of winners are those countries for which trade liberalization result 
in significant export opportunities.  This is particularly the case of developed countries of the 
Cairns group, but the gains remain limited (welfare increases by 0.5%).  For developing countries 
of the Cairns group, there is no change in welfare, overall.  Note, however that this reflects 
contrasting effects between the agricultural sector (which gains) and other sectors, and between 
producers and consumers: the latter are adversely affected by higher food prices.
11  A 
decomposition of welfare gains also shows that the decrease of rents earned from TRQs and the 
relative shift of resources away from the (modern) industrial sector balance the benefits reaped 
from improved terms of trade and increased arable land usage. 
 
A Doha agreement results in welfare losses for several groups of developing countries.  
Mediterranean countries suffer from the higher price of cotton caused by the reduction in US and 
EU domestic subsidies which affects their garment industry and, as net food importing countries, 
from the higher price of agricultural products.  Because they already benefit from some (limited) 
preferential access to the EU market, the benefits they reap from the decrease in agricultural 
tariffs are not sufficient to offset the negative effects of higher world prices.  Sub-Saharan 
African countries also experience a welfare loss as a consequence of a Doha agreement, in spite 
of a slight improvement in their terms-of-trade.  This results from the combined effect of higher 
                                                 
11 Note that our group of "developing members of the Cairns group" includes not only efficient agricultural exporters 
such as Brazil and Argentina, but also many Asian countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, etc.  Welfare 
effects are also contrasted between the different members of the group.   11 
 
prices for food imports, and from the extra competition faced by their exports due to preference 
erosion.  The elimination of EU export subsidies is the major force driving welfare losses, but the 
decomposition of welfare changes shows that reduced TRQ rents contributes significantly to the 
welfare loss observed for sub-Saharan Africa.  The actual effect of a future agreement may even 
be more negative than what is suggested by the figures in table 6.  It is uncertain whether future 
negotiations will lead to a cut in US cotton subsidies by 55% as we assumed in this scenario, 
because of well-organized interest groups.  
Impact on the agricultural sector. The global welfare effects hide contrasted effects between the 
farm sector and other sectors, especially in DCs.  The effect on the farm sector can be seen 
through the changes in the returns to land and the changes in the return to agricultural labor. We 
focus here on the returns to workers that are specific to the agricultural sector.
12  Table 7 shows 
that trade liberalization in the agricultural sector has very significant consequences, especially for 
EU farmers.  Indeed, the cut in domestic support, which is assumed to remain uncompensated by 
lump sum transfers or any other green-box type of subsidies in our scenario, has a very large 
effect on returns to land in the EU.  The farm sector in developed Cairns group countries benefits 
from the agreement.  This is also true in most developing countries, but in smaller proportions.  
Indeed, returns to land in sub-Saharan Africa only increase by 0.2% and returns to labor by 1.2%.  
The figures are respectively 0.6% and 1.4%in the developing members of the Cairns group. 
[Insert table 7] 
 
Comments and sensitivity analysis 
A surprising result is the limited increase in trade and welfare resulting from a Doha agreement.  
Indeed, the gains in world welfare that we obtain are significantly smaller than those found by 
other authors.  Another difference with most other studies is that we do not find that all countries 
gain from multilateral trade liberalization in agriculture.  Some DCs, like sub-Saharan Africa 
experience some (slight) net losses, even though the farm sector enjoys some small benefits from 
trade liberalization.  Such differences with a large body of the literature demand explanations and 
some sensitivity analysis.  
One explanation for the small welfare gains resulting from the agreement is that the agricultural 
and food sector only represents a small proportion of the gross domestic product in many 
economies, and here, we simulated only the impact of the agricultural component of the Doha 
agreement.  Other authors have focused on a larger agreement (e.g. Hertel, Hoekman and Martin; 
Francois, van Meijl, van Tongeren).  They obtain significant gains in the textiles sector, for 
example, or gains linked to specific (and somewhat ad hoc) assumptions on trade facilitation or 
positive externalities of trade liberalization.  Another explanation is that our scenario accounts 
only for the changes in tariffs and domestic support that result from actual changes in applied 
tariffs and policies. Because of data availability, most modelers apply the cuts in bound tariffs 
negotiated under the WTO as if they were made on applied tariffs.  As a sensitivity analysis, we 
                                                 
12 This excludes skilled workers, since this type of work is assumed to be perfectly mobile across sector. The 
imperfect mobility (and therefore the sector specificity) thus only concerns unskilled workers, but they contribute 
almost 90% of labor value added in the agricultural sector worldwide, and to more than 80% in the EU in the model, 
which relies for this aspect on the GTAP database.    12 
 
ran our tariff cut scenario on the applied tariffs, rather than the bound tariffs.  Under this 
alternative assumption, the subsequent increase in world agricultural exports is much higher 
(15.0% to be compared to 6.1% when the gap between applied and bound duties is taken into 
account) and the increase of agricultural exports of the Cairns developing countries is also larger 
than in table 5 (+21.5%, that is to say a USD 11.2 bln augmentation, while our result gives USD 
5.7 bln).  
The negative outcome found for sub-Saharan and Mediterranean countries as a result of 
implementing the Doha Agenda is among the striking features of the results.  As mentioned 
above, a likely explanation for this finding is the erosion of the tariff preferences these countries 
enjoyed on their export market. In order to check for this explanation, we carried out an 
additional simulation of the Doha Agenda, where trade preferences are not taken into account in 
the baseline.
13  This simulation also highlights what difference covering exhaustively trade 
preferences makes on the assessed impact of multilateral liberalization.  On average, the 
difference with the standard assessment is not large.  However, agrofood exports of sub-Saharan 
African and Mediterranean countries increase substantially more under this scenario (+7.0% vs. 
+4.7% for sub-Saharan Africa when preferences are accounted for, and 13.4% vs. 8.8% for 
Mediterranean countries).  More importantly, the impact on welfare is significantly improved for 
these two regions. In particular, the loss previously found for sub-Saharan African countries is 
changed for a slight gain (+0.06%) when preferences are not accounted for.  This confirms that 
the erosion of preferences significantly harms sub-Saharan African and Mediterranean countries 
as a result of multilateral liberalization, in spite of the fairly limited liberalization actually 
delivered by the Harbinson proposal, as emphasized above.  
A puzzling result is the small welfare changes for the Cairns group countries, even though these 
countries experience a significant increase in exports.  Indeed, given the figures in table 6, it is 
surprising that the developed members of the Cairns group fight so hard for agricultural 
liberalization, which would barely bring them an increase in welfare corresponding to a few 
months of GDP growth.  It is even more surprising that the Doha agreement results in no welfare 
gain for the developing countries of the Cairns group, since countries such as Brazil and 
Argentina are assumed to reap large benefits from agricultural trade liberalization.  Because some 
of the results might be dependent of the model specification, the following sections provide some 
sensitivity analysis. 
First, the Armington specification may underestimate the increase in imports of Cairns group 
products by the EU, following a decrease in EU domestic support.  It is well known that the 
Armington assumption is questionable for agricultural products (Alston et al.), even though it 
remains used by most modelers because of its parsimony in parameters.  Agricultural goods are 
often relatively homogenous and the Armington assumption tends to overestimate the degree of 
differentiation of goods according to their origin.  Recent econometric estimates suggest that 
elasticities could be larger than the ones we used in the model (see Erkel-Rousse and Mirza).  In 
order to assess the sensitivity of the results to the assumptions on the substitution between 
                                                 
13 This is done by substituting, in the benchmark data, MFN duties to applied duties. However, five exceptions are 
made, to account for large agreements: the EU, NAFTA, ANZCERTA, the EU-EFTA Agreement and SACU are still 
taken into account. This ensures that the coverage of preferential regimes under this alternative simulation is exactly 
the same as in GTAP version 5 database, which has been so far the workhorse for the assessing the impact of 
multilateral liberalisation.   13 
 
domestic products and imports, we modified the model's elasticities of substitution in the 
agricultural sector.
14  Doubling the value of the elasticities affects trade and welfare.  World 
agrofood exports increase by almost 11% (rather than 6% in our results), with the same uneven 
distribution amongst zones:  Developed countries exports of the Cairns group increase 
considerably (+20.2%), while the increase in exports of sub-Saharan Africa after trade 
liberalization is a modest 6.2%.  Welfare increases are larger in economies where government 
intervention in agriculture generates large distortions (EU, Developed Asia).  The welfare 
changes in sub-Saharan Africa is still negative (-0.04% instead of -0.03%). 
Some unwanted consequences of our assumption of imperfect competition à la Dixit-Stiglitz and 
increasing returns to scale in industrial sectors have been documented (Francois and Roland-
Holst).  Francois, van Meijl and van Tongeren explain that they ran into a problem that also 
affects our results.  When large agricultural producers expand their farm output, they draw 
resources from their industrial sectors, which contract.  The presence of economies of scale in 
these sectors, and the "love of variety" effect linked to the Dixit-Stiglitz specification, implies the 
predicted contraction of these sectors leads to negative welfare effects.  This could contribute to 
the low welfare gains in the developing members of the Cairns group, which were expected to 
draw larger gains from the Doha Round in our results.  In order to assess how important this 
effect is, we ran the same simulation assuming perfect competition in all sectors.  That is, the 
economies of scale and love of variety effects are eliminated.  The changes in welfare and in 
other macroeconomic variables are indeed slightly affected by this assumption: for example, 
welfare in Cairns developing countries now increase by 0.04% while it increased by 0.01% under 
the imperfect competition assumption. The welfare gains are also larger for the developed 
member of the Cairns group (0.08% instead of 0.04%), and the small welfare loss for sub Saharan 
Africa (-0.01%) disappears under the perfect competition assumption.  The changes are 
nevertheless very limited for these three groups of countries.  The welfare changes in other 
countries remain practically the same under this alternative assumption. 
Unlike most AGE models (with the exception of the LINKAGE model, the source of inspiration 
for our specification) we introduced some flexibility in land supply in some large countries, with 
a low population density.  While we believe that an exogenous land assumption understates 
supply response, this assumption is important since it dampens world price effects.  We ran a 
simulation under the assumption of exogenous land.  The endogenous land assumption does not 
affect significantly the results, even if world prices increase by 2.5% (rather than 2.8% in our 
simulations).  The impact is very minor on the world price of goods exported by DCs, and on DC 
welfare changes.  
Another potential explanation for the difference in results with other studies is the dual labor 
market assumption for DCs. We ran the simulation relaxing this assumption.  Under the dual 
market assumption, an expansion of the agricultural sector means that some resources are drawn 
into a less productive sector.  Under the single market assumption, the welfare losses for 
Mediterranean and sub-Saharan African countries are smaller.  The welfare gains for the 
developing members of the Cairns group are larger, but remain very limited (+0.3%).  However, 
the difference remain very small compared to our basic simulation, a few percent of a percentage 
                                                 
14 The source of the substitution elasticities is the GTAP database. Elasticities of substitution between domestic and 
imported goods range between 2 and 3.8, averaging 2.3, in agricultural sectors.  Elasticities between imports of 
different origin are roughly twice this level.  Note, however that when applied to small levels of imports, larger 
elasticities still lead to a small increase in trade flows.   14 
 
point in the computed changes.  That is, none of the specific modeling assumptions described in 
this section affects significantly our findings. 
 
Conclusion 
We used an AGE model to assess the effects of an agreement on agriculture in the Doha round of 
negotiations.  Because the July 2004 framework agreement did not lead to a decision on the 
precise modalities of the cuts in tariffs and domestic support, we assumed that further 
negotiations will lead to modalities that we could approximate with the provisions included in the 
WTO draft compromise proposal of March 2003.   
Our work includes significant innovations.  Our data on applied protection rely on original work 
which assesses the protection arising from ad valorem tariffs, specific tariffs and tariff rate quotas 
at a highly disaggregated level (HS6 classification), taking into account all preferential 
agreements.  Ad-valorem-equivalent bound duties, the ones subject to liberalization, are also 
estimated at the HS6 level.  Domestic support in the EU and the US are represented through a 
variety of instruments, also using original and very detailed data on the various policy tools.  The 
effect of the FSRI and the 2003 reform of the CAP are included, assuming full implementation in 
an enlarged EU.  In establishing scenarios for simulation, we accounted for the fact that 
commitments on bound tariffs and AMS ceilings show only a remote connection with the 
changes in actual tariffs and policies, given the "binding overhang" that characterizes the tariff 
structure in many countries, and the gap between actual support and AMS ceilings.  The tariff 
cuts are applied on some 5,000 different tariffs at the six-digit level before the new variables are 
aggregated consistently with our 30-sector and 11-country group model.  
The results show very significant differences with most of the findings of other similar AGE 
models.  Because the data that was developed for this project will be made available to a large 
public as part of the future version of the GTAP database (GTAP6), more refined assessments of 
the effect of the Doha negotiations by the large community of users of these data will be made 
possible.  Our estimates of the impact of a Doha agreement on agriculture suggest much lower 
welfare gains than most other studies.  In addition, we find that a large number of developing 
countries would actually experience a loss in welfare, a result that is seldom observed with AGE 
models.  Cairns group countries would expand their agricultural output and exports.  However, in 
terms of welfare, the main winners are developed countries that reduce their own distorting 
support.  Negative consequences are nevertheless significant for the farm sector in the EU. They 
are more limited for developed Asia and the US. 
Our results suggest that the erosion of existing preferences will be an important problem, 
especially for sub-Saharan Africa.  African countries which benefit from preferential access to 
the EU and the US will face competition from Cairns group countries.  Overall, sub-Saharan 
countries will experience a decrease in welfare, even under our optimistic assumption that US 
and EU cotton and tobacco subsidies will be reduced by a large amount.  Overall, there will be a 
limited increase in world prices for agricultural products.  However, this limited increase will 
negatively affect some net food importers and some cotton importers such as Mediterranean 
countries.  Like sub-Saharan African countries, they will not gain on other grounds, because of 
the erosion of preferential margins and diminished rents on their quota-constrained exports to the 
EU.    15 
 
A sensitivity analysis shows that these results are hardly affected by the various assumptions that 
make our model specific, compared to other AGE models (dual labor market, endogenous land 
supply, monopolistic competition, etc.).  That is, the differences between our conclusions and 
those of most AGE modelers mainly come from the use of better data, namely on preferential 
tariffs, and more careful design of the actual effect of the posted reductions in tariff and farm 
support.  In particular, our results suggest that better data would modify significantly the 
conclusions that are often drawn about the benefits of trade liberalization for developing 
countries.  General conclusions that developing countries will reap most of the benefits from 
trade liberalization in agriculture do not seem to hold when one takes properly into account 
applied tariffs, the erosion of preferences, and trade diversion.  Clearly, the effects on developing 
countries will be contrasted, and some group of countries such as sub-Saharan Africa are more 
likely to suffer than to benefit from a multilateral trade liberalization.   
Corrective measures are needed for possible losers, but the present Special and Differentiated 
Treament (SDT) provisions under the WTO cannot be considered as an adequate response.  
Eligibility to the SDT relies on self-declaration of countries, and the one-size-fits-all status of 
"developing" country does not account for the considerable differences between DCs (Korea and 
Haïti are examples).  In addition, the SDT (under its present form) merely allow developing 
countries to opt out liberalization measures.  Opting out is not an adequate response to the erosion 
of preferences for, say, African or Caribbean countries. 
In order to make the results of a Doha Round more consistent with Pareto-improvement 
principles, more differentiation between developing countries should be allowed.  In that sense, 
our findings are at odds with the idea that preferences should be as little discriminating as 
possible, an idea which is widely shared amongst economists (see IPC), and which is also at the 
core of the evolution of multilateral trade rules (e.g. the "Enabling clause" for the GSP, the need 
to be granted a waiver for other non reciprocal regimes).   
The specific treatment mentioned for LDCs in the July 2004 Decision is consistent with extra 
differentiation across developing countries, but not all potential losers are LDCs.  The 2004 
decision of the WTO Appellate body on the EU drug-fighting related provisions of the GSP 
leaves a door open for further differentiation, under well-defined conditions.  This might be a 
way to amend the SDT in a way that would reflect the growing heterogeneity of the developing 
countries.  Clearly, introducing more differentiation between countries raises difficult issues.  The 
risk exists that eligibility would be subject to questionable political conditions (already an issue 
in some US non-reciprocal preferential schemes), or that discrimination reflects arbitrary 
historical ties (an issue in EU preferences).  More objective criteria would be preferable, and 
preferential treatments should be GSP-consistent rather than based on geography.  Some elements 
of differentiation are already introduced in the EU and US GSP, in particular the EU system of 
graduation, which involves development indicators.  While more assessment of the potential 
unwanted effects would be needed, there might be a source of inspiration for a revised modalities 
of the SDT, in spite of the likely opposition from the most advanced DCs. 
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Table 1. Bilateral tariff, all agricultural products aggregate (%) 
 








China South  Asia RoW Average 
EU 25 
 
 5.8  22.2  52.0  15.7  35.1  30.2  16.1  25.5 52.8 26.2  18.1 
USA 
 
16.2   28.9  57.9  5.1  23.3  18.9  13.2  27.4  45.4 12.7  18.8 
Asia  
developed 
12.5 3.7    17.9  6.2  32.2  31.4  17.3  25.8  51.6  24.8  16.0 
EFTA 
 
7.9  3.9  11.6    10.6 21.4 22.9 19.1  30.5  43.0  21.3  10.7 
Cairns  
developed 
25.9  3.4 24.9 79.8    37.4  14.7  11.8 16.9  42.6  18.7  21.2 
Mediterranean 
 
7.3  4.0 14.1 25.7  3.7    30.2  20.3 23.6  34.9  22.9  12.7 
Sub-Saharan 
 Africa 
6.7  3.0 12.0  8.9  0.7  18.0    26.1 14.7  35.0  17.8  10.2 
Cairns 
developing 
18.3 3.8  24.0  34.7  5.9  28.9  27.9    29.3  65.0  23.0  20.8 
China 
 
13.5 5.1  21.7  36.7  8.7  36.2  26.0  19.6    46.5  29.2  16.3 
South Asia 
 
14.4  1.8 33.7 21.9  1.8  37.4  24.4  17.4 14.5   20.0  16.7 
Rest of  
the World 
15.1 2.1  17.4  25.8  2.6  32.5  25.1  19.7  22.9  45.6    15.1 
Average 
 
16.7 4.7  22.5  47.7  10.8  30.8  26.3  16.0  25.1  52.6  21.1   
Source: MacMap_HS6 and authors’ calculation. Year 2001. Ad valorem equivalents. 
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Table 2. Impact of the tariff cut scenario on market access for agricultural products  
 
 











China South  Asia RoW  Average 
EU 25 
 
  -1.0 -6.2 -3.3 -2.3  -4.2  -0.4 -1.2  -10.4  -1.8  -1.0  -3.1 
USA 
 
-6.0    -6.5 -2.7 -1.1  -2.9  -0.2 -0.9  -10.4  -5.9  -0.4  -4.3 
Asia  
developed 
-4.6 -0.8    -2.9  -1.1  -2.5  -0.2 -0.6  -9.2  -0.3  -1.1  -3.0 
EFTA 
 
-2.5 -0.5  -1.4    -1.1  -2.7  -0.1 -0.5  -10.0  -0.2  -1.2  -1.9 
Cairns  
developed 
-12.1 -0.2  -6.7  -2.7    -3.8  -0.5 -1.0  -6.7  -4.7  -0.4  -6.4 
Mediterranean 
 
-2.9  -0.8 -3.5 -2.2 -0.9    -0.2 -1.0  -9.1  -1.8  -1.0  -2.6 
Sub-Saharan 
 Africa 
-3.3  -0.1 -4.1 -0.7 -0.1  -1.1   -0.3  -5.1  -0.4  -1.1  -2.2 
Cairns 
developing 
-8.0  -0.7 -5.4 -1.9 -1.4  -2.6 -0.2    -10.1  -1.8  -0.6  -4.6 
China 
 
-4.5  -1.5 -5.9 -2.5 -2.7  -4.4 -0.7  -0.8    -7.3  -0.8  -3.6 
South Asia 
 
-7.0  -0.3 -9.7 -4.2 -0.2  -4.9 -0.3  -1.0  -3.8    -0.5  -3.9 
Rest of  
the World 
-6.6  -0.2 -5.0 -2.5 -0.5  -3.4 -0.7  -1.0  -8.5  -2.3    -4.2 
Average 
 
-7.1  -0.8 -5.9 -2.9 -1.8  -3.3 -0.3  -1.0  -9.4  -2.7  -0.7   
Source: MacMap_HS6 and authors’ calculation. Year 2001.  
In percentage points (i.e. the figures correspond to x-y if a tariff of x% is reduced and results in a y% tariff). 
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Table 3. Impact of the tariff cut scenario on market access by sector  
 












-30.5 -1.8  -81.3  0.0  0.0  -0.1  0.0  -0.1  0.0  -23.0  -0.2  -17.6 
Processed rice 
 
-82.2 -1.3  -66.5  0.0  0.0  -0.1  0.0  -0.1  0.0  -21.0  -0.2  -18.9 
Coarse grains 
 
-4.2 -0.4  -25.7  0.0  0.0  -0.7  0.0  -1.1  -7.5  -14.1  -0.6  -5.3 
Wheat 
 
-0.2 -1.0  -0.4  0.0  0.0  -1.2  0.0  -0.3  0.0  -28.5  -0.2  -1.2 
Sugar 
 
-76.9 0.0  -64.1  -26.6  -0.9  0.0  -0.3  -3.0  -0.1  0.0  -0.2  -20.6 
Oilseeds 
 
0.0 -1.3  -1.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -36.1  0.0  -0.2  -4.6 
Live animals 
 
-17.6 0.0  -6.7  0.0  0.0  -6.5  0.0  -0.2  -2.0  0.0  -0.1  -6.3 
Animal  
products 
-1.8  -0.1 -3.4 -0.2 -1.1  -0.5  -0.1 -0.3  -3.1  0.0  -1.2  -1.5 
Meat 
 
-29.0 -0.1  -11.0  -0.3  -0.1  -25.0  -0.3  -2.0  -10.9  0.0  -0.2  -11.8 
Meat  
products 
-7.7 -1.6  -15.3  -6.1  -9.6  -17.0  -0.4  -2.6  -5.9  0.0  -0.2  -6.7 
Dairy  
products 
-18.3  -0.6 -4.7 -8.1 -1.6  -4.6  -0.6  0.0 -16.3  0.0  -1.3 -4.7 
Fibers 
 
0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.4  -0.2  -0.2  0.0  0.0  -0.1  -0.1 
Fruits & vegetables  -7.6  -1.2  -5.4  -1.0  -0.5 -8.9 -2.0  -1.8  -8.0  0.0  -0.5  -4.2 
Other crops 
 
-0.8  -0.3 -0.7 -1.4 -0.4  -1.5  -0.4 -0.4  -9.0  0.0  -2.1  -1.1 
Fats 
 
-1.8  -1.4 -1.5 -3.8 -0.4  -0.5  0.0  0.0  -6.1 0.0  -0.2 -1.5 
Beverages & 
Tobacco 
-6.2  -0.2 -4.0 -3.6 -2.8  -5.2  -0.2  -3.2 -24.7  0.0  -3.4 -4.1 
Food 
 
-2.8  -1.0 -2.4 -2.2 -1.4  -2.6  -0.5 -0.6  -6.3  0.0  -0.1  -2.0 
Total agrofood 
 
-7.1  -0.8 -5.9 -2.9 -1.8  -3.3 -0.3  -1.0  -9.4  -2.7  -0.7   
Source: MacMap_HS6 and authors’ calculation. Year 2001.  
In percentage points (i.e. the figures correspond to x-y if a tariff of x% is reduced and results in a y% tariff). 
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Table 4. Impact of the Doha Agreement scenario on world prices (import prices) 
 
Sector Initial  share  in 
world exports 




0.6 8.2  0.1  1.3 9.4 
Processed 
 Rice 
1.2 0.6  0.0  0.3 1.0 
Coarse grains 
 
3.6 2.6  0.1  0.5 3.1 
Wheat 
 
3.9 1.4  0.1  0.9 2.3 
Sugar 
 
2.7 0.2  5.6  -1.5 2.8 
Oilseeds 
 
5.7 9.1  0.0  0.5 9.7 
Live animals 
 
1.2 0.9  0.1  0.7 1.6 
Animal products 
 
3.4 0.6  0.0  0.1 0.8 
Meat 
 
4.0 0.6  0.1  0.5 1.2 
Meat  
products 
4.8 0.3  1.5  0.1 2.0 
Dairy  
products 
3.6 0.3  2.3  0.0 2.7 
Fibers 
 
3.6 25.6  0.0  0.2 26.0 
Fruits & vegetable 
 
8.3 0.1  0.2  0.5 0.8 
Other crops 
 
10.1 0.8  0.0  0.4  1.2 
Fats 
 
7.2 2.8  0.0  0.2 3.0 
Beverages and  
Tobacco 
11.0 0.1  0.5  0.3  0.3 
Processed food 
 
25.0 0.3  0.6  0.4  0.9 
Total agrofood 
 
100.0 2.1  0.5  0.3  2.8 
Source: Authors' simulations. (*) World imports here refer to imports between the regions considered in 
the model. Imports between countries within the same region are not considered. ‘World price’ is a 
weighted average of the changes in each region’s import prices.   22 
 
Table 5. Impacts of Doha agreement scenario on agrofood exports (% change) 
 






Tariffs Doha  agreement, 
 3 pillars 
EU 25 
 
61 642   -1.9  -4.2  7.4  2.7 
USA 
 
69 969   -6.7  0.6  7.2  0.8 
Asia developed 
 
5 716   0.6  1.2  10.7  11.8 
EFTA 
 
6 428   2.4  -6.6  2.7  -3.8 
Cairns developed 
 
38 875   2.2  0.6  10.2  12.8 
Mediterranean 
 
8 304   2.0  -0.2  6.2  8.8 
Cairns developing 
 
54 934   2.7  -0.1  7.9  10.4 
China 
 
11 947   2.0  0.0  11.0  13.2 
RoW 
 
35 074   2.1  -0.5  5.5  6.8 
South Asia 
 
7 513   3.1  -0.4  3.3  6.4 
SubSaharan Africa 
 
12 420   3.3  -1.2  2.7  4.7 
World 
 
312 822   -0.5  -0.9  7.4  6.1 
Richest countries 
 
182 630   -2.6  -1.3  7.9  4.2 
Developing countries 
 
110 260   2.4  -0.2  7.3  9.4 
Poorest countries 
 
19 933   3.3  -0.9  2.9  5.4 
Source: Authors' simulations.    
Note: Initial levels are expressed in millions of US dollars. The figures refer to f.o.b. values.   23 
 
Table 6. Impacts on welfare (% change) 
 
  Initial GDP  





Tariffs Doha  agreement, 
 3 pillars 
EU 25  8 235  0.04  0.01  0.09  0.14 
USA 7  952  0.05  0.00  0.00  0.05 
Asia developed  5 233  -0.05  0.00  0.11  0.05 
EFTA 408  -0.04  0.08  0.03  0.11 
Cairns developed  1 092  -0.01  0.00  0.04  0.04 
Mediterranean 454  -0.27  -0.07  0.16  -0.16 
Cairns developing  2 012  -0.02  0.00  0.02  0.00 
China 876  -0.21  0.00  0.38  0.15 
RoW 2  026  -0.07  -0.06  0.01  -0.10 
South Asia  527  -0.01  0.00  0.19  0.17 
Sub-Saharan Africa  207  0.01  -0.08  0.03  -0.03 
World 29  023  0.02  0.00  0.06  0.08 
Richest countries  22 920  0.02  0.00  0.06  0.08 
Developing countries  5 368  -0.09  -0.03  0.08  -0.03 
Poorest countries  734  -0.01  -0.03  0.15  0.11 
Source: Authors' simulations.  
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Table 7: Impacts on the real return to land and agricultural labor (% change) 
 









Tariffs Doha  agreement 
3 pillars 
EU 25  -14.6  0.0  -0.4  -15.1    -0.5  0.0  -0.5  -1.1 
USA -0.4  0.0  0.2  -0.2    -2.2  0.0  0.6  -1.7 
Asia Developed  0.5  0.0  -2.3  -1.8    0.3  0.0  -1.2  -0.8 
EFTA 1.1  0.5  -0.5  1.1    0.3  -1.6  0.2  -1.5 
Cairns Developed  -0.3  0.0  1.3  1.1    1.0  0.1  1.7  2.8 
Mediterranean 0.7  0.0  0.0  0.8    0.0  -0.1  0.3  0.2 
Cairns Developing  0.6  0.0  0.0  0.6    0.5  0.0  0.8  1.4 
China 0.5  0.0  -0.3  0.3    -0.1  0.1  0.9  0.7 
RoW 1.1  0.0  0.0  1.1    0.6  -0.2  0.7  1.1 
South Asia  -0.1  0.0  0.0  -0.1    0.5  0.0  0.2  0.6 
SubSaharan Africa  0.2  -0.1  0.0  0.2    1.1  -0.2  0.3  1.2 
Source: Authors' simulations.  
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Appendix I. The baseline and the scenario for the Doha Agreement simulation 
I.1. Sectoral aggregation 
Table A1 shows the sectoral aggregation that is used in the agricultural version of the MIRAGE model.  
Table A1 also shows the type of competition that is assumed for each sector, i.e. perfect competition, or 
imperfect competition that is represented by both a Dixit-Stiglitz specification and a vertical differentiation 
in two categories of quality (see explanations below).  The category of economic activity (agriculture, 
food, other primary, industry, services) is also shown, given that this distinction is used in some particular 
result aggregates.  The sectors where there are subsidized exports in the baseline, or in which subsidized 
exports are possible in order to clear the domestic market, are also indicated.  The last column specifies 
whether in developing countries, the corresponding sector is part of the "modern" sector (in which an 
efficient wage is paid) or the traditional one, under the assumption of a dual labor market. 
The precise contents of each sector, regarding tariff lines, can be found in Dimaranan and McDougall 
(2002), as well as in the GTAP correspondence tables with the HS6 (see www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu). 
 
Table A1. Sectoral aggregation 




Aggregate Possibility  of 
subsidized exports 
Traditional/ 
Modern in DCs 
Paddy rice   Perfect  No  Agriculture  EU  Traditionnal 
Processed rice   Imperfect  Yes  Food  products    Modern 
Coarse grainss   Perfect  No  Agriculture  EU  Traditionnal 
Wheat   Perfect  No  Agriculture  EU  Traditionnal 
Sugar   Perfect  No  Food  products  EU  Modern 
Oilseeds   Perfect  No  Agriculture    Traditionnal 
Live animals   Perfect  No  Agriculture    Traditionnal 
Animal products   Perfect  No  Agriculture    Traditionnal 
Meat    Perfect  No  Food products   EU  Traditionnal 
Meat products   Imperfect  Yes  Food  products  EU/US  Modern 
Dairy   Imperfect  Yes  Food  products EU/US  Traditionnal 
Fibers   Perfect  No  Agriculture    Traditionnal 
Vegetables and 
fruits 
 Perfect  Yes  (Low)  Agriculture  EU  Traditionnal 
Other crops   Perfect  Yes  (Low)  Agriculture    Traditionnal 
Fats    Imperfect  Yes (Low)   Food products    Traditionnal 
Beverages and 
tobacco 
 Imperfect  Yes  Food  products  EU  Modern 
Processed food   Imperfect  Yes  Food  products  EU  Modern 
Forestry   Perfect  No  Agriculture    Traditionnal 
Fishing   Perfect  No  Agriculture    Traditionnal 
Primary   Perfect  No  Other  primary    Modern 
Wood products   Imperfect  Yes  Industry    Modern 
Wool   Perfect  No  Agriculture    Traditionnal 
Textiles   Imperfect  Yes  Industry    Modern 
Clothing   Imperfect  Yes  Industry    Modern 
Leather   Imperfect  Yes  Industry    Modern 
Equipment   Imperfect  Yes  Industry    Modern 
Chemicals   Imperfect  Yes  Industry    Modern 
Other industry   Imperfect  Yes  Industry    Modern 
Services   Imperfect  Yes  Services    Modern 
 
In some sectors, an element of vertical differentiation is introduced (in addition to the horizontal 
differentiation introduced by the Dixit-Stiglitz specification).  That is, we assume that there are two 
different qualities of products, depending on the level of development of the country of origin, in particular 
sectors.  The elasticity of substitution is therefore lower between products originating from countries of 
different level of development, for the sectors indicated by "yes" in the third column of Table A1.  This   27 
 
intends to reflect that qualities differ between origins with a North/South approximation (case in industrial 
goods). 
In some sectors (indicated by "low"), elasticities of substitution are country group-specific and are set at 
low levels.  The purpose is to take into account that the given aggregate (e.g. "Other crops") includes very 
different products according to the country group (e.g. cotton, cocoa, coffee).  Indeed the use of 
undifferentiated elasticities of substitution would have unwanted effects (e.g. a cut in EU tobacco subsidies 
would generate extra imports of cocoa). 
 
I.2. Country aggregation 
Table A2 provides a list of the 11 country groups that are used in the aggregate model.  Country groups 
with small/large arable land area are distinguished, since we assume different supply elasticities of 
agricultural land (see details in the article). Table A2 also provides a (crude) classification of the country 
groups in two categories (developed / developing) of countries, since some aggregate results are presented 
for developing countries. 
 
Table A2: Country aggregates 
Country group  Countries  Assumption on agricultural land 
available (for the endogenous land 
supply modelling) 
Development 
EU 25  European Union, enlarged to 25 countries  Small  Developed 
USA  United States of America  Large  Developed 
Developed Asia  Japan, South Korea  Small  Developed 
EFTA  Switzerland, Norway, Iceland  Small  Developed 
Developed countries of 
the Cairns group 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand  Large   Developed 
Mediterranean  Maghreb, Mashreq, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Croatia  Small  Developing 
Sub Saharan Africa  Africa, including islands close to Africa (Seychelles, 
Madagascar, Maurice) with the exception of Maghreb and 
Mashrek 
Large  Developing 
Developing countries of 
the Cairns group 
All other Cairns group members, including Brazil, Argentina, 
Chile, Malaysia, Philipines, etc. 
Large  Developing 
China  China and Hong Kong  Large  Developing 
South Asia  Bangladesh, India, Pakistan  Small  Developing 
Rest of the worl (RoW)  Others  Small  Developing 
 
I.3. The baseline 
The baseline represents a fictitious mid-term reference point using the most recent data available as a 
benchmark.  It is based on the situation in the year 2001, but some data come from the GTAP dataset and 
correspond to the year 1997 (namely non-agricultural data).  In addition, we assumed that the EU 
enlargement had taken place, reflecting the 2005 situation.  Finally, we assumed that the reforms of farm 
policies decided in 2002 in the US, in 1999 and in 2003 for the EU were fully implemented, while in 
reality, the transition period spans over several years in the case of the EU.  
That is, the baseline provides a mid term reference points which the scenario of the Doha agreement is 
applied to, as a counterfactual situation, not a faithful representation of the present situation. 
 
I.4. Data on protection 
The protection data used in these simulations is the result of an original work, which led to the constitution 
of the MAcMap dataset.  The methodology is further detailed in Bouët et al. (2004).  These data will be 
included in the forthcoming version 6 of the GTAP dataset.  It is noteworthy that, compared to the original   28 
 
MAcMaps data, the data used in the present paper have has been dramatically improved following 
corrections and suggestions by several members of the GTAP consortium and researchers of Purdue 
University, and has benefited from additional input supplied by the Economic Research Service of the US 
Department of Agriculture, namely in the area of tariff-rate quotas. 
The data originates from the source files of UNCTAD's TRAINS database, from countries notifications to 
the WTO (Consolidated Tariff Schedules), from the Agricultural Market Access Database -AMAD-, 
supplemented with data and from national custom information (reported to of UNCTAD, or directly to 
ITC).  This information is completed by other relevant sources (administrations, statistical institutes, 
international organizations, websites of regional agreements, etc.).  This combined information 
characterizes the trade policy applied by 163 countries to 208 exporting partners.  It includes information 
on tariffs (ad valorem, specific, mixed, compound and antidumping duties), and tariff quotas. 
This database brings three original contributions: (i) it covers all preferential agreements enforced in 2001;  
(ii) the calculation of ad valorem equivalent of specific tariffs (at the 6 digit level) accounts for exporters 
specialization in terms of product quality, which impacts the unit value of exports; (iii) the aggregation 
method used limits the extent of the endogeneity bias.  
The exhaustive coverage of preferential agreements makes a sizeable difference with regards to other 
existing multilateral databases on protection, given the large coverage of such agreements.  In particular, 
the data used in the model includes all EU preferential agreements, including the Lomé/Cotonou régime 
and the “Everything But Arms” (EBA) initiative.  The information is not communicated to the various 
international organizations by the EU Commission, explaining why EU preferences are only partially 
included in databases such as UNCTAD's TRAINS, or not included at all (the IDB database of the WTO).  
Specific data from the TARIC (Tariff Intégré des Communautés Européennes) was used in order to 
complement international data sources. 
Information on tariff rate quotas (TRQs) comes from AMAD, and from the WTO.  Tariffs under TRQs 
come from different sources, including US International Trade Commission and TARIC.  A marginal 
protection duty and a rent are calculated, taking into account the bilateral allocation of each quota, when 
applicable, and the fill rate of each quota.  The marginal protection duty (sometimes called shadow tariff) 
is defined as the ad valorem tariff duty which, applied to the same product, would lead to the same level of 
import as the TRQ considered.  This marginal protection rate is assumed to be equal to the inside-quota 
tariff rate (IQTR) if the quota is not filled (fill rate inferior to 90%), and to the outside-quota tariff rate 
(OQTR) as soon as the quota is filled (fill rate equal to 100%).  In between (fill rate included between 90% 
and 100%), the quota is assumed to be filled (administration problems are likely to cause the quota not be 
exactly filled, even when the IQTR is not binding), but the OQTR is assumed to be prohibitive.  In this 
case, without any better proxy, the marginal protection rate is approximated by the average of the IQTR 
and the OQTR.   
The vertical specialization of countries along the quality ladder has been shown to be widespread, and 
closely correlated with countries factor endowment and technology (Fontagné et al., 1997; Schott, 2004).  
Given that specific tariffs have a more restrictive impact on unprocessed or low quality goods, these 
differences are worth taking into account.  The method used here relies on reference groups.  Built as a 
result of a hierarchical clustering analysis based on real Gross Domestic Product per capita (i.e. GDP 
expressed in purchasing power parities) and trade openness, each of the five groups gathers relatively 
similar countries in terms of export specialization.  Ad valorem equivalents are then calculated based on the 
(weighted) median unit value of worldwide exports originating from the reference group the exporter 
belongs to (see Bouët et al. 2004 for details).  
The aggregation methodology intends to reflect trade restrictiveness, and to limit the extent of the 
endogeneity bias.  This bias arises when average tariffs are computed using bilateral imports as weighting 
scheme, since higher tariffs ceteris paribus lead to lower imports (Laird and Yeats, 1998).  Instead,   29 
 
average tariffs are computed here using exports of the exporting country toward the whole reference group 
of the importer, as weighting scheme across products and across exporters. 
 
I.4. Farm support and policy variables 
Sources. The different forms of farm support are expressed as a percentage of the sectoral output (or input) 
in 2001 and are then included the dataset so as to replace original GTAP data.  For OECD countries, the 
farm support data relies on primary information from the OECD on the Producer Support Estimates 
(PSEs).  A detailed classification of the various forms of payments was made, relying on the OECD "PSE 
Cookbook" so as to model the farm policies (OECD, 2003).  Basic data from the PSE dataset was kindly 
provided by the Secretariat.  For non-PSE commodities data, some data was provided by the OECD 
secretariat, and other data from national sources have been used (e.g. budget data for subsidies to cotton, 
tobacco, olive oil in the EU; data provided by the Economic Research Service of the USDA for US 
programs).  For China, data from FAPRI (Food and Agricultural Research Institute) was used.  Additional 
data was on EU agricultural payments was provided by Hans Grinsted Jensen, from FOI Copenhagen. 
For non-OECD/China countries, the data that has been used for domestic agricultural policies have been 
limited to the instruments available in the standard 5.3 version of the GTAP dataset (see Dimaranan and 
McDougall, 2002).  
Tax and subsidies instruments. Agricultural policies are represented by various types of taxes and 
subsidies for modeling purposes.  We distinguish market price support, output subsidies, capital subsidies, 
variable input subsidies, land subsidies, and decoupled subsidies, in the sense that the latter do not target a 
particular agricultural sector.  That is, for example, the EU Common agricultural policy is modeled by 
different price wedges and percentage subsidies, either on output, on variable inputs, on land or on capital.  
In addition, market price support is modeled through the combination of tariffs and of export subsidies.  
Regarding land set-aside, we assume that only a part of total land is available for production.   
All subsidies (limited and unlimited) that are a function of the volume of output are treated as output 
subsidies.  Capital subsidies include support of farm investment (e.g. national subsidies on interest charges 
given by some EU member states), and payments per head of cattle (e.g. beef premia in the EU
15).  
Variable input subsidies include tax deductions (fuel in some countries), subsidies to particular inputs (e.g. 
cotton seeds in the EU).  Direct payments per hectare that are based on reference yields (e.g. arable crops 
payments in the EU) are treated as land subsidies.  Decoupled payments (payments to self-employed labor) 
include all payments that are conditional to input constraints, agri-environmental payments, and payments 
that are based on reference levels and not tied to land, input use or output.   
With these assumptions, it is noteworthy that, for example, most of the EU support to the beef sector in 
2001 is treated as a capital subsidy (more exactly to the capital specific in the live animals sector); most of 
the support to grains in the EU is treated as land subsidy (specific to land in the grains sector); most of the 
support to the dairy sector is treated as market price support in both the EU and the US; most of the 
support to coarse grains and oilseed is treated as decoupled in the US (with the exception of marketing 
loans, treated as output subsidies).  
The introduction of recent policy changes.  The representation of farm policies on the basis of the 2001 
data and instruments, are then amended so as to take into account the changes brought about by the EU 
Agenda 2000 (including the June 2003 reform package) and the US FSRI.  Note that in a counterfactual 
scenario presented in section II of this appendix, the simulation is run without the effect of the June 2003 
package, for comparison purposes. 
                                                 
15 Even though in the scenario including of the June 2003 package, these payments are then considered as 
largely decoupled, reflecting the various options for partial decoupling chosen by the different member 
states.   30 
 
The FSRI and the Agenda 2000 result in changes in the set-aside, compared to the 2001 data. In the 
baseline, the increase in the acreage under conservation programs caused by the FSRI is only partially 
taken into account (as an extra negative productivity shock on land for wheat) compared to the situation 
prevailing in 2001.  Indeed, we consider that only a share of the increased acreage eligible will be used for 
conservation (Westcott et al., 2002), and that the overall effect on output will be limited, because of several 
arguments put forward by Gardner (2002) and Sumner (2003).  In the EU, in order to account for 
exemption of small producers and other forms of slippage, the 10% set aside on arable crops was taken 
into account as a 7% land set-aside only (this amount of set-aside is assumed to be unchanged after the 
June 2003 reform package, and we assumed that the 5% rate in 2003/2004 was motivated by  the unusual 
climatic and wheat price situation). 
The Agenda 2000 and the FSRI also affect the various policy variables.  Relatively to the 2001 figures, the 
effects of the implementation of the of the US 2002 FSRI are taken into account by an increase in the 
output subsidy for wheat (6%) and other coarse grains (3%), and a decrease in the case of soybean (4%).  
An output subsidy on dairy (3% of the value of production) is introduced.  
In the European Union, the implementation of the Agenda 2000 was taken into account in the data on 
intervention prices and support for 2001, except in the case of oilseeds (where a further 13% decrease in 
subsidies based on acreage was introduced) and in the case of beef (a 32% decrease of the intervention 
prices was applied in order to account for the July 2002 decrease in intervention price).  In order to account 
for the final (i.e. 2002) increase in beef premia, the overall support per head of cattle (introduced in the 
model as a capital subsidy in the live bovines sector), the 2001 support was increased by 13%.  
Finally, the effects of the EU June 2003 reform package are introduced in the standard baseline. The June 
2003 reform package shifts a most of the land subsidies to the decoupled category, as well as a percentage 
of the capital subsidies, reflecting the partial decoupling and the options chosen by the various member 
states. 
In the rice sector, the June 2003 package results in a fall of intervention price of 50%, which is replaced by 
a 200 million euros of land payment and a 270 million euros of decoupled payment.  In the beef sector, the 
Agenda 2000 led to a 12 billion capital subsidy, that the June 2003 package reduces to 3 billion, the 
difference also becoming a decoupled payment.  In the dairy sector, the intervention price decrease by 15 
percent, and a 4.2 billion decoupled payment is introduced.  
In order to model the Doha agreement scenario as a change to the baseline, the AMS (i.e. after the recent 
policy changes) must be measured as a benchmark.  The change in the actual AMS induced by the EU June 
2003 package is estimated by using the 2002 output times the gap between future and 2002 intervention 
prices for each category, and the shift from amber/blue box to green box of some payments.  Basically, the 
changes are dramatic in the crop sector AMS where more than 70% of the payments tied to the land 
allocated to each production in 2001 shift to the green box and are considered as returns to an aggregate of 
primary factors). 
Note that the introduction of the June 2003 reform package in the baseline is debatable.  Indeed, even if the 
main components of the reform (the single farm payment) will enter in force in 2005, some other 
components will only be fully implemented in 2012.  In addition, the adoption of the June 2003 package, 
may be seen as an indirect consequence of the Doha Round, and one might argue that the assessment of the 
impact of the Doha agreement should be made against a benchmark that correspond to the assumption 
prevailing under the 1999 reform.  Because this package has a considerable impact on the EU farm support 
(by shifting a large bulk of payments from the "blue box payments" that we treat mainly as subsidies to 
land or animal capital in the model, to more decoupled payments), we ran simulations of the impact of the 
Doha Agreement excluding the June 2003 package from the baseline.  The results are presented in the 
section II on "sensitivity analysis" in this Appendix.   31 
 
 
I.5. Tariff cuts in the Doha scenario 
WTO negotiations deal with bound tariffs, which frequently differ widely from applied tariffs.  In order to 
describe accurately the effect of a given, negotiated tariff cut formula, a separate database has been built 
for bound protection.  Based on WTO's CTS database and on complementary sources (from national 
institutes and government and international organizations) when necessary, this database gives the ad 
valorem equivalent (AVE) of bound duties, at the HS-6 level, for all WTO members.   
The methodology used in calculating AVEs is the same as for applied protection, and consistency between 
both databases is checked.  The only methodological difference lies in the calculation of AVEs. As pointed 
out above, AVE of applied, specific tariff are computed so as to account for the different quality 
specialization of exporter.  Based on the differences in unit values of worldwide exports of the reference 
group the exporter belongs to, this results in five different unit values being taken into account, for each 
product.  This is intended to reflect the trade restrictiveness of specific tariff, but it is inconsistent with the 
WTO approach, and in particular with the most favored nation principle.  This is why, for bound duties, the 
AVE of specific tariffs are computed using worldwide unit values.  In applying the formula described 
below, applied specific duties are also converted using worldwide unit values.  Once the percentage cut is 
computed, it is applied to the applied rates used in the model, namely to the AVEs computed for applied 
protection, using reference-group unit values. This method thus alternatively makes use of two distinct 
AVE calculation method: one (based on reference group unit values) is intended to reflect accurately trade 
restrictiveness, the other (based on multilateral unit values) aims at reflecting the “institutional” AVE, 
likely to be taken into account in the WTO negotiations.  
Applied tariffs resulting from a given formula are computed separately for each HS-6 product, by 
combining these two databases.  The formula is applied to the initial bound tariff, and the final applied 
duty is calculated as the minimum between the initial applied tariff and the final bound tariff (both 
computed using worldwide unit values).  The rents of TRQs are re-calculated accordingly, assuming that 
the same formula is applied to out-of-quota tariff rates as to other applied tariffs.  
 
Table A3: Scenario for tariff cuts 
Developed countries     Developing countries    
Initial tariffs  Reduction rate  Initial tariffs  Reduction rate 
t>90%  60%  t>120%  40% 
T=<90% and t>15%  50%  t=<120% and t>60%  35% 
T=<15%  40%  t=<60% and t>20%  30% 
    T=<20%  25% 
 
Table A3 provides the exact cuts in bound tariffs applied in the simulation scenario.  They are drawn from 
WTO (2003), i.e. the March 2003 draft compromise on modalities (the so-called revised Harbinson 
proposal).  These cuts in tariffs are applied to the existing tariffs at the HS6 level.  Then the aggregation 
procedure described in Bouët et al. (2004) is used to construct new matrices (i.e. thirty 11x11 matrices) of 
bilateral tariffs for each of the 30 sectors and the 11 country groups that we consider here. 
 
I.6. Cut in farm support in the Doha scenario 
We assume that distorting farm support will be cut by 55% in the Doha scenario.  This is an optimistic 
assumption, given that this figure failed to reach an agreement when proposed by the Chairman of the 
WTO agricultural committee Harbinson in March 2003. However, the 55% cut applies to the AMS ceiling.  
In the EU, Canada and Japan, the actual AMS is below this ceiling. (In the US, the amber box payments 
were above this ceiling for recent years, but the EU notified some of them under the de minimis clause).    32 
 
The implementation of the Agenda 2000 and the June 2003 package will reduce even further the actual 
amber box support.   
 
Table A4. Data on actual AMS, ceiling AMS, and counterfactual data as shock on actual support. 
Country   European Union  United 
States 
Canada Japan 
Currencies  mn euros  mn US$  mn C$  bn Yens 
Actual data 
Green box support   19931  49749  1300  2686 
Blue box support  19792  0  0  93 
Amber box type support (including distortive support notified
under the de minimis clause) 
47941 24297 790  781 
Official AMS (i.e. amber box adjusted for de minimis)  47886  16862  790  748 
Present WTO ceilings 
AMS ceiling   69450  19899  4659  4139 
Percent of ceiling filled  0.69  0.85  0.17  0.18 
Support in the baseline 
Amber box  32486  24297  790  781 
Blue box  792  0  0  0 
Green box  46131  50814  331  228 
Assumptions on ceilings under the Doha scenario 
Ceiling amber box  27780  7960  1864  1656 
Ceiling blue box  9896  0  0  0 
Ceiling de minimis  6408  5070  331  228 
Actual shock on farm support under the counterfactual Doha scenario (relative to the baseline, i.e. shock zero if 
the baseline is smaller that the counterfactual ceiling under the Doha scenario) 
Green box support  0  0  0  0 
Blue box support  -18%  0  0  0 
Amber box support  -14%  -53%  0  0 
Actual shock on farm support under the counterfactual Doha scenario under the alternative simulation where the 
June 2003 EU package is not implemented 
Green box support  0  0  0  0 
Blue box support  -55%  0  0  0 
Amber box support  -42%  -53%  0  0 
 
Table A4 presents the actual effects of the 55% cut in AMS ceilings. It is noteworthy that in some 
countries such as Japan, the ceiling is so high that the actual cut will have little practical impact.  In the 
EU, given that most of the blue box payments will have shifted to the green box by the end of the 
implementation period of the June 2003 reform package, the impact on the actual support is also very 
limited.  In the alternative scenario, where we do not include the June 2003 reform package in the baseline, 
the impact of the Doha round is larger (a 42% reduction in the amber box support and a 55% reduction in 
the blue box support). 
In order to assess the actual effects of the 55% cuts in AMS ceilings, we took into account the gap between 
the actual AMS and the ceiling, and we also accounted for the recent policy reforms.  That is, in the EU 
baseline, we calculated the future AMS that will take place after implementation of the June 2003 package.  
In order to do so, we calculated sector specific market price support as the difference between the future 
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Appendix II.  Results and sensitivity analysis 
In this appendix, we provide some additional information on the results of the simulation of Doha 
agreement scenario described above. In the following tables, we provide the changes resulting from  
•  The three pillars of the Doha Agreement simulation: 
o  a cut in domestic support (labeled "Domestic support" 
o  the suppression of export subsidies (labeled "Export subsidies") 
o  the cut in tariffs (labeled "Tariffs") 
•  The combined effects of the three pillars (labeled "Doha") 
 
In addition, the tables provide the results of the Doha scenario (i.e. the three pillars combined) under 
alternative assumptions in order to test for sensitivity. These are : 
•  "Exogenous land": land supply is assumed to be exogenous in all countries 
•  "No dual labor market": the assumption of a dual labor market in DCs is removed, the labor is 
assumed to be perfectly competitive in all countries 
•  "Perfect competition": perfect competition is assumed to hold in all sectors 
•  "Double elasticities": all the elasticities of substitution in the demand functions are multiplied 
by two (Armington elasticities) 
•  "Without NCAP": the simulation is run assuming that, in the baseline, the package of EU 
reforms decided in June 2003 would not be implemented 
•  "Cut on applied tariffs": we assume that all the tariff cuts in our scenario (see Table A2) are 
made on applied tariffs rather than on the bound tariffs. That is, we ignore the existence of 
"binding overhang". The difference with the regular "Doha" scenario provides an assessment 
of the differences in results obtained if, like most modelers, we assumed that bound tariffs 
were actually applied 
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Table A5 Impact of  scenario of Doha agreement on world prices (import prices) and sensitivity analysis (%)       
 





Export subsidies  Tariffs Doha  Exogenous 
land 












Paddy rice  0.6  8.2  0.1  1.3  9.4  9.5  9.2  9.3  10.8  10.2  11.7  9.5 
Processed rice  1.2  0.6  0.0  0.3  1.0  1.0  0.9  0.9  1.3  1.2  1.4  1.2 
Coarse grainss  3.6  2.6  0.1  0.5  3.1  2.7  3.0  3.1  3.0  4.5  2.1  3.4 
Wheat 3.9  1.4  0.1  0.9  2.3  2.0  2.2  2.3  2.5  3.7  2.4  2.6 
Sugar  2.7  0.2 5.6  -1.5 2.8 2.4  2.4  2.4  1.6 2.7 1.1  2.5 
Oilseeds 5.7  9.1  0.0  0.5  9.7  9.5  9.6  9.7  9.6  10.0  11.0  10.0 
Live animals  1.2  0.9  0.1  0.7  1.6  1.4  1.5  1.6  1.9  3.4  0.3  1.9 
Animal products  3.4  0.6  0.0  0.1  0.8  0.6  0.6  0.8  0.7  1.0  0.1  0.9 
Meat 4.0  0.6  0.1  0.5  1.2  1.0  1.1  1.2  1.4  3.4  0.5  1.4 
Meat products  4.8  0.3  1.5  0.1  2.0  0.4  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.7  0.1  0.6 
Dairy products  3.6  0.3  2.3  0.0  2.7  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.8  12.8  0.9  0.4 
Fibers 3.6  25.6  0.0  0.2  26.0  25.8  26.0  26.3  35.9  26.2  30.4  26.2 
Fruits & 
vegetables 
8.3 0.1  0.2  0.5  0.8  0.5 0.4  0.6  0.6  0.9  1.0 0.9 
Other crops  10.1  0.8  0.0  0.4  1.2  1.2  1.0  1.3  1.3  1.5  1.6  1.5 
Fats 7.2  2.8  0.0  0.2  3.0  2.9  2.9  3.0  3.2  3.2  2.1  2.7 
Beverage 
Tobacco 
11.0 0.1  0.5  0.3 0.3  -0.2 -0.2  -0.2  -0.3  -0.1  -0.2 -0.2 
Food 25.0  0.3  0.6  0.4  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  1.2  0.2  1.0 
Total agrofood  100.0  2.1  0.5  0.3  2.8  2.4  2.5  2.6  2.9  3.4  2.5  2.7 
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Table A6 Impact of  scenario of Doha agreement on world prices of developing  countries trade and sensitivity analysis (%)       
 





Export subsidies  Tariffs Doha  Exogenous 
land 












Paddy rice  0.3  0.5  0.0  0.4  0.9  1.0  0.7  0.9  1.3  1.1  1.4  1.2 
Processed rice  2.3  0.4  0.1  0.4  0.8  0.9  0.7  0.8  1.1  1.0  0.9  1.1 
Coarse grainss  2.4  0.4  0.1  0.3  0.7  0.8  0.5  0.8  0.7  1.0  -3.1  1.2 
Wheat 1.1  0.4  0.1  0.5  1.0  1.0  0.8  1.0  1.1  1.3  -1.6  1.3 
Sugar 4.6  0.2  0.5  0.3  1.1  0.8  0.7  0.8  0.8  1.0  -1.0  0.9 
Oilseeds 3.6  1.5  0.0  0.2  1.8  1.9  1.6  1.9  2.5  2.1  1.8  2.1 
Live animals  0.6  0.4  0.1  0.4  0.8  0.8  0.6  0.9  1.0  1.2  -4.5  1.1 
Animal products  3.2  0.4  0.1  0.2  0.6  0.6  0.4  0.6  0.7  0.9  -1.0  1.0 
Meat 1.6  0.3  0.1  0.5  0.8  0.9  0.7  0.9  1.1  1.1  -2.3  1.2 
Meat products  3.3  0.3  0.1  0.2  0.5  0.6  0.4  0.6  0.6  0.8  -1.0  0.8 
Dairy products  0.6  0.3  1.3  0.3  1.9  0.6  0.5  0.6  0.6  1.0  -1.7  0.8 
Fibers 1.5  3.0  0.0  0.3  3.3  3.3  3.1  3.3  7.0  3.5  3.8  3.6 
Fruits & 
vegetables 
12.8 0.3  0.0  0.5 0.9  1.0  0.6  1.0  1.1  1.1  1.5  1.3 
Other crops  19.3  0.5  0.0  0.4  0.9  1.0  0.6  1.0  1.0  1.2  1.2  1.3 
Fats 10.8  0.7  0.1  0.2  1.0  1.0  0.9  1.1  1.2  1.2  -0.1  1.3 
Beverage 
Tobacco 
3.4 0.2  0.1  0.2  0.4  0.4 0.4  0.4  0.4  0.6  0.3 0.6 
Food 28.3  0.3  0.1  0.2  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.8  -0.8  0.8 
Total agrofood  100.0  0.5  0.1  0.3  0.8  0.9  0.7  0.9  1.0  1.1  0.1  1.1 
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Table A.7 Changes in total welfare, Doha agreement on agriculture scenario and sensitivity analyis         
 


















EU 25  8 235  0.04  0.01  0.09  0.14  0.14  0.14  0.12  0.29  0.39  0.18  0.18 
USA  7  952  0.05 0.00  0.00  0.05 0.07  0.05  0.04 0.06  0.04 0.06 0.05 
Asia Developed  5 233  -0.05  0.00  0.11  0.05  0.06  0.05  0.04  0.09  0.04  0.24  0.13 
EFTA 408  -0.04  0.08  0.03  0.11  -0.03  -0.03  -0.01  -0.04  -0.14  0.91  0.07 
Cairns Developed  1 092  -0.01  0.00  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.08  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.07 
Mediterranean  454  -0.27 -0.07  0.16  -0.16 -0.16  -0.10  -0.11 -0.20  -0.34 0.23 -0.11 
Cairns Developing  2 012  -0.02  0.00  0.02  0.00  -0.07  0.03  0.04  -0.05  0.00  0.00  0.02 
China  876  -0.21  0.00  0.38  0.15  0.15 0.13  0.13  0.22 0.17  -0.32  0.15 
RoW  2  026  -0.07 -0.06  0.01  -0.10 -0.08  -0.04  -0.05 -0.08  -0.17 0.04 -0.02 
South  Asia  527  -0.01  0.00  0.19  0.17  0.15 0.14  0.12  0.16 0.17  0.31  0.18 
SubSaharan  Africa  207  0.01 -0.08  0.03  -0.03 -0.05  -0.01  0.01 -0.04  -0.11 0.02 0.06 
World  29  023  0.02 0.00  0.06  0.08 0.09  0.08  0.07 0.15  0.18 0.13 0.11 
Rich  22  920  0.02 0.00  0.06  0.08 0.09  0.08  0.07 0.15  0.17 0.16 0.11 
DCs  5  368  -0.09 -0.03  0.08  -0.03 -0.05  0.01 0.01 -0.03  -0.07 -0.02 0.01 





Table A.8 Changes in the terms of trade, Doha agreement on agriculture scenario and sensitivity analyis       
 
















EU 25    -0.02 0.07  -0.07  -0.05 -0.07  -0.06  -0.08 0.06  0.08 0.11 -0.16 
USA    0.28  -0.01  0.08  0.35  0.35 0.35  0.34  0.39 0.33  0.44  0.35 
Asia Developed    -0.19 -0.02  -0.11  -0.31 -0.29  -0.30  -0.32 -0.31  -0.34 -0.36 -0.36 
EFTA    -0.06 0.06 0.00  0.00 -0.09  -0.09  -0.07 -0.09  -0.14 -0.38 -0.09 
Cairns Developed    0.06 0.00  0.19  0.26 0.23  0.25  0.33 0.28  0.28 0.29 0.33 
Mediterranean    -0.41 -0.06  -0.04  -0.48 -0.46  -0.47  -0.46 -0.75  -0.57 -0.63 -0.38 
Cairns Developing    0.03 0.00  0.17  0.21 0.21  0.19  0.25 0.09  0.20 0.16 0.33 
China    -0.04 0.01  -0.13  -0.18 -0.19  -0.16  -0.18 -0.33  -0.16 -0.22 -0.08 
RoW    -0.07 -0.09  0.04  -0.09 -0.05  -0.05  -0.04 -0.10  -0.18 -0.21 0.01 
South Asia    0.20 -0.01  -0.19  0.01 0.00  0.00  -0.05 -0.12  0.01 -0.65 0.03 
SubSaharan Africa    0.17  -0.13  0.10  0.18  0.20 0.15  0.22  0.14 0.04  -0.08  0.40 
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Table A.9 Changes in agrifood production, Doha agreement on agriculture scenario and sensitivity analyis       
 


















EU  25  117    -0.83 -0.20  -0.63  -1.57 -1.34  -1.41  -1.42 -3.05  -1.94 -1.33 -2.11 
USA  84    -1.85 0.12 0.75  -1.05 -0.87  -1.17  -1.10 -1.39  -0.90 -1.30 -1.08 
Asia  Developed  52    -0.28 0.14  -1.93  -2.08 -2.15  -2.19  -2.08 -3.96  -1.95 -3.50 -2.23 
EFTA  5    0.71 -1.87  -0.47  -2.73 0.18  0.35  0.27 -0.11  1.39  -18.98  -0.68 
Cairns Developed  17   0.54  0.30  2.88  3.66  3.28  3.35  3.06  5.89  4.47  4.75  4.80 
Mediterranean  21    0.73 0.29  -0.27  0.73 0.62  0.67  0.57 0.88  1.09 1.85 0.83 
Cairns Developing  65   0.48  0.02  0.78  1.25  1.09  1.31  1.23  2.28  1.36  2.80  1.60 
China  37    0.41  0.01  -0.41  0.01  -0.03 0.12  0.00  -0.03 0.00  2.54  0.08 
RoW  55    0.33 0.34  0.13  0.64 0.42  0.58  0.47 0.65  1.03 -0.29 0.50 
South Asia  25   0.21  0.01  -0.23  0.00  -0.05  0.01  0.01  0.18  0.02  0.16  -0.02 
SubSaharan Africa  11   0.34  0.10  0.40  0.76  0.65  0.82  0.72  1.21  0.92  0.96  0.89 
World  489   -0.34  0.03  -0.06  -0.39  -0.35  -0.36  -0.38  -0.74  -0.29  -0.29  -0.44 
Rich  276    -0.93 -0.04  -0.23  -1.20 -1.03  -1.16  -1.14 -2.10  -1.17 -1.66 -1.36 
DCs  178    0.45 0.15  0.21  0.74 0.60  0.77  0.66 1.13  0.94 1.68 0.85 
Poorest  36    0.25 0.04  -0.04  0.23 0.16  0.26  0.23 0.49  0.29 0.40 0.26 
 
 
Table A.10 Changes in agrifood exports, Doha agreement on agriculture scenario and sensitivity analyis       
 


















EU 25  61 642   -1.9  -4.2  7.4  2.7  4.6  4.5  4.3  7.4  -1.6  17.0  6.6 
USA  69 969   -6.7  0.6  7.2  0.8  1.1  0.1  0.5  -0.9  1.0  4.1  2.2 
Asia Developed  5 716   0.6  1.2  10.7  11.8  11.1  11.2  11.6  22.2  11.9  27.2  21.1 
EFTA  6 428   2.4  -6.6  2.7  -3.8  4.3  4.7  4.3  6.4  2.8  2.8  4.5 
Cairns Developed  38 875   2.2  0.6  10.2  12.8  12.0  12.1  11.5  20.2  15.0  17.7  17.3 
Mediterranean  8 304   2.0  -0.2  6.2  8.8  8.6  8.4  7.5  18.4  8.6  17.6  13.4 
Cairns Developing  54 934   2.7  -0.1  7.9  10.4  10.0  10.4  10.1  18.7  10.7  21.5  13.6 
China  11 947   2.0  0.0  11.0  13.2  12.9  13.5  13.0  27.2  13.0  32.6  18.0 
RoW  35 074   2.1  -0.5  5.5  6.8  6.6  6.9  6.8  10.2  6.5  13.5  7.9 
South Asia  7 513   3.1  -0.4  3.3  6.4  6.2  6.4  6.5  10.3  6.3  19.6  5.7 
SubSaharan Africa  12 420   3.3  -1.2  2.7  4.7  4.6  4.8  4.7  6.2  4.5  12.4  7.0 
World  312 822   -0.5  -0.9  7.4  6.1  6.5  6.4  6.3  10.8  5.7  15.0  6.6 
Rich  182  630    -2.6  -1.3  7.9  4.2  5.0 4.6  4.6  7.4 3.5  12.0  7.6 
DCs 110  260    2.4  -0.2  7.3  9.4  9.1  9.5  9.2  16.9  9.5  19.9  12.3 
Poorest  19 933   3.3  -0.9  2.9  5.4  5.2  5.4  5.4  7.8  5.2  15.1  6.5 
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Table A.11 Changes in agrifood imports, Doha agreement on agriculture scenario and sensitivity analyis       
 


















EU 25  71 390   0.5  -1.3  13.9  12.8  13.2  13.4  13.0  22.5  13.4  19.6  20.7 
USA  48 160   1.6  -0.4  1.4  2.8  2.4  3.1  2.8  4.3  1.8  7.5  5.0 
Asia Developed  77 500   1.0  -0.3  8.9  9.6  9.8  9.9  9.3  15.9  9.2  17.9  12.4 
EFTA  7 461   -0.4  -2.3  5.5  3.7  4.8  4.7  4.6  8.1  2.3  50.6  6.3 
Cairns Developed  14 003   -1.7  -0.5  4.8  2.8  3.3  3.0  3.7  7.0  2.5  9.5  6.3 
Mediterranean  15 821   -5.4  -1.4  5.0  -1.5  -1.0  -1.1  -0.5  1.8  -3.9  15.9  -0.5 
Cairns Developing  22 349   -4.0  -0.3  3.5  -0.7  -0.2  -0.8  -0.3  0.7  -1.6  5.4  0.1 
China  18 403   -6.7  -0.1  16.9  10.1  10.1  9.8  10.6  11.2  10.0  -2.1  10.7 
RoW  51 952   -1.4  -1.8  1.9  -0.7  0.2  -0.2  0.0  0.3  -2.0  14.7  0.4 
South Asia  6 698   -3.3  -0.4  11.5  7.8  7.9  7.5  7.5  2.4  7.4  26.7  7.5 
SubSaharan Africa  5 524   -0.1  -2.8  1.6  -0.8  -0.4  -0.8  -0.5  -3.1  -2.4  18.5  0.6 
World 339  261    -0.7  -0.9  7.4  6.0  6.3  6.3  6.2  10.2  5.4  14.8  6.4 
Rich 218  514    0.8  -0.8  8.5  8.5  8.7  8.9  8.5  14.7  8.3  16.7  12.9 
DCs 108  525    -3.4  -1.1  5.2  1.0  1.6  1.2  1.7  2.4  -0.2  10.1  2.0 




Table A.12 Changes in net trade position, as a percentage of original trade (Delta X- Delta M)/(X+M)     
 
















EU 25    -1.1  -1.3  -4.1  -5.6  -4.9  -5.1  -5.0 -8.6  -7.9 -2.6 -8.0 
USA    -4.6 0.5 3.7  -0.7 -0.4  -1.2  -0.8 -2.3  -0.2 -0.7 -0.7 
Asia  Developed    -0.9  0.4 -7.5  -8.1  -8.4  -8.5 -7.8 -13.3  -7.8 -14.8  -10.1 
EFTA   1.3  -1.8  -1.7  -3.7  -0.6  -0.3  -0.5  -1.4  0.1  -25.9  -1.3 
Cairns Developed    2.0  0.5  6.2  8.7  7.9  8.1  7.5  13.0  10.4  10.5  11.1 
Mediterranean    4.2 0.9  -1.1  4.0 3.6  3.6  2.9 5.2  5.6 -4.4 5.0 
Cairns Developing    3.1  0.0  4.6  7.6  7.2  7.6  7.3  13.1  8.1  13.7  9.6 
China   4.8  0.0  -5.9  -0.9  -1.1  -0.6  -1.3  3.9  -0.9  14.1  0.6 
RoW    1.7 0.8  1.1  3.1 2.5  2.9  2.7 3.9  3.8 -3.3 2.9 
South Asia    3.2  0.0  -3.7  -0.3  -0.4  -0.2  -0.1 4.3  -0.2 -2.2 -0.6 
SubSaharan  Africa    2.3 0.0  1.4  3.5 3.3  3.6  3.4 5.3  3.8 2.9 4.7 
Rich   -1.6  -0.2  -1.1  -2.7  -2.5  -2.8  -2.5 -4.6  -2.9 -3.6 -3.6 
DCs    2.9 0.5  1.1  4.2 3.8  4.2  3.8 7.3  4.9 5.0 5.2 
Poorest    2.7 0.0  -0.9  1.8 1.7  1.9  1.9 4.9  2.1 0.6 2.4 
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Table A.13 Changes in (real) returns to agricultural labor, Doha agreement on agriculture scenario and sensitivity analyis     
 
















EU  25    -0.52 -0.04  -0.54  -1.12 -1.15  -1.06  -1.06 -2.65  0.24 -1.14 -1.71 
USA    -2.24 0.03 0.57  -1.69 -1.95  -1.74  -1.68 -2.51  -1.56 -1.54 -1.53 
Asia  Developed    0.34  0.02  -1.19  -0.81 -0.92  -0.85  -0.80 -1.82  -0.73 -2.99 -1.37 
EFTA    0.29 -1.59  0.20  -1.50 0.40  0.44  0.43 0.69  1.46 -5.69 0.01 
Cairns  Developed    1.03 0.09  1.71  2.81 2.58  2.67  2.65 4.05  3.19 3.04 3.41 
Mediterranean    -0.01  -0.11  0.29  0.21  0.18 0.22  0.36  0.07 0.03  2.81  0.59 
Cairns  Developing   0.50 0.04  0.84  1.37 1.06  0.75  1.65 1.74  1.55 2.82 1.91 
China    -0.12  0.05  0.86  0.72  0.67 0.22  0.69  0.96 0.92  2.24  1.07 
RoW    0.57  -0.20  0.72  1.14  1.14 0.60  1.38  1.71 1.36  1.77  1.69 
South  Asia    0.47 0.01  0.17  0.64 0.60  0.18  0.47 1.13  0.74 0.72 0.71 




Table A.14 Changes in (real) returns to agricultural land, Doha agreement on agriculture scenario and sensitivity analyis     
 
















EU 25    -14.59  0.01  -0.35  -15.06  -14.4  -15.1  -15.1 -18.4  -12.7 -22.6 -15.3 
USA    -0.37  0.00  0.24  -0.21  -1.6  -0.2  -0.2 -0.9  -0.3 -1.2 -0.4 
Asia  Developed    0.48 0.03  -2.28  -1.79  -2.2  -1.8  -1.8 -2.6  -1.8 -5.2 -3.7 
EFTA    1.14  0.52  -0.50  1.10  1.0 0.9  0.9  1.5 1.2  -6.0  0.7 
Cairns  Developed    -0.32  0.00  1.33  1.08  0.8 1.0  0.7  2.8 1.1  3.5  1.0 
Mediterranean    0.74  -0.04  0.03  0.77  0.9 0.8  0.8  1.5 0.5  0.9  0.7 
Cairns  Developing    0.63  -0.03  -0.01  0.60  1.1 0.6  0.6  1.7 0.5  2.1  0.6 
China    0.52  -0.01  -0.26  0.30  0.3 0.3  0.3  1.0 0.2  1.6  0.3 
RoW    1.10  0.00  0.03  1.15  1.3 1.1  1.2  1.9 1.1  1.6  1.1 
South  Asia    -0.07  -0.03  -0.02  -0.10  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1 0.0  -0.2 2.6 -0.2 
SubSaharan  Africa    0.23  -0.08  0.05  0.22  0.6 0.2  0.2  0.6 0.2  0.6  0.1 
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Appendix III. Welfare decomposition 
Table A15 shows the effect of the various factors.  This decomposition shows the impact of the various 
mechanisms at stake in the welfare gains or losses.  More specifically, the contribution of the following 
changes to the overall variation of welfare:  
i/ changes in the number of productive units of labor (in the case of a dual labor market);  
ii/ changes in the quantity of arable land;  
iii/ changes in the quota rents; iv/ changes in the terms of trade;  
v/ changes in allocative efficiency of resources;  
vi/ other sources; 
 
Table A16 shows the same decomposition under the alternative model specifications that were used to 
assess the sensitivity of the results in section II. 
 
Table A15 Welfare decomposition, three pillars and Doha agreement (in%) 
Scenario  Contributions to welfare gains  EU 25  USA  Asia Dd  EFTA  Cairns Dd  Mediter'n Cairns  Dg  China  RoW  Sth Asia  SS Africa  World 
Dom. Support  Dual labor market gains  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.06  -0.02  -0.06  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.20 
  Land supply gains  0.00  -0.02  0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.05 
 Allocation  efficiency  gains  0.04  0.03  0.00  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02  0.00  -0.05  -0.01  -0.02  0.01  -0.05 
  Tariff-quota  gains  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
  Terms of trade gains  0.00  0.03  -0.03  -0.02  0.02  -0.11  0.01  -0.01  -0.02  0.03  0.06  -0.06 
 Other  gains  0.01  0.01  -0.02  -0.01  -0.01  -0.09  -0.02  -0.10  -0.02  -0.02  -0.04  -0.33 
  Total welfare gains  0.04  0.05  -0.05  -0.04  -0.01  -0.27  -0.02  -0.21  -0.07  -0.01  0.01  -0.60 
                       
Exp. Subsidies  Dual labor market gains  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.00  -0.01  -0.02 
  Land supply gains  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  Allocation  efficiency  gains  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00  -0.03  0.00 0.00  -0.02  0.00 -0.02 -0.02 
  Tariff-quota  gains  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
  Terms of trade gains  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.00  -0.02  0.00  -0.04  -0.04 
  Other  gains  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  -0.02  0.00 0.00  -0.02  0.00 -0.01 -0.05 
  Total welfare gains  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.08  0.00  -0.07  0.00  0.00  -0.06  0.00  -0.08  -0.13 
                       
Tariffs  Dual labor market gains  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.03  -0.01  0.08  0.00  0.04  0.02  0.18 
  Land supply gains  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.01  0.03 
  Allocation  efficiency  gains  0.07 0.00 0.08  0.00  0.00  0.10  0.01  0.22 0.02 0.15  0.02  0.66 
  Tariff-quota  gains  0.01  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  -0.01 -0.01  -0.01  0.00 -0.04 -0.06 
  Terms of trade gains  -0.01  0.01  -0.01  0.00  0.05  -0.02  0.03  -0.03  0.01  -0.03  0.03  0.04 
  Other  gains  0.02 -0.01 0.04  0.03  -0.02  0.05  -0.03  0.11 -0.01 0.04  -0.01  0.21 
  Total welfare gains  0.09  0.00  0.11  0.03  0.04  0.16  0.02  0.38  0.01  0.19  0.03  1.06 
Doha  scenario                       
  Dual labor market gains  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.04  -0.02  0.02  -0.02  0.03  -0.01  -0.04 
  Land supply gains  0.00  -0.01  0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.01  0.03  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.07 
 Allocation  efficiency  gains  0.11  0.03  0.07  0.10  -0.01  0.06  0.01  0.17  -0.01  0.12  0.01  0.66 
  Tariff-quota  gains  0.01  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  -0.01 -0.01  -0.01  0.00 -0.04 -0.06 
  Terms of trade gains  -0.01  0.04  -0.04  0.01  0.07  -0.13  0.04  -0.04  -0.02  0.00  0.06  -0.03 
 Other  gains  0.03  0.00  0.02  0.01  -0.03  -0.06  -0.05  0.00  -0.04  0.01  -0.07  -0.18 
  Total welfare gains  0.14  0.05  0.05  0.11  0.04  -0.16  0.00  0.15  -0.10  0.17  -0.03  0.40 
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Table A.16 Welfare decomposition, sensitivity analysis scenarios (in %) 
Scenarios            
        
Contributions to welfare 
 gains 
EU 25  USA  Asia Dd  EFTA  Cairns Dd  Mediter'n Cairns Dg  China  RoW  Sth Asia  SS Africa  
Exogenous land   Dual labor market gains  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.03  -0.03  0.02  -0.02  0.02  -0.02  -0.06 
  Land  supply  gains  0.01 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.01 
  Allocation efficiency
gains  0.11 0.03 0.08  -0.01  -0.01 0.07 0.00  0.17 0.00 0.12 0.01  0.57 
  Tariff-quota  gains  0.01 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01  -0.01 0.00 -0.04  -0.06 
  Terms of trade gains  -0.01  0.04  -0.04  -0.03  0.07  -0.13  0.04  -0.04  -0.01  0.00  0.06  -0.06 
  Other  gains  0.03 0.00 0.02  0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.07  0.00 -0.03 0.01 -0.07  -0.18 
  Total welfare gains  0.14  0.07  0.06  -0.03  0.04  -0.16  -0.07  0.15  -0.08  0.15  -0.05  0.22 
                   
No dual labor 
market  
Dual labor market gains 
0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
  Land  supply  gains  0.00 -0.01 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03  0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02  0.06 
  Allocation efficiency
gains  0.11 0.03 0.08  -0.01  -0.01 0.07 0.01  0.16 0.00 0.12 0.01  0.56 
  Tariff-quota  gains  0.01 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01  -0.01 0.00 -0.04  -0.06 
  Terms of trade gains  -0.01  0.04  -0.04  -0.03  0.07  -0.14  0.04  -0.03  -0.01  0.00  0.05  -0.07 
  Other  gains  0.03 0.00 0.02  0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04  0.00 -0.03 0.01 -0.05  -0.12 
  Total  welfare  gains  0.14 0.05 0.05  -0.03 0.03 -0.10 0.03  0.13 -0.04 0.14 -0.01  0.37 
                   
Perfect 
competition 
Dual labor market gains 
0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.02  0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01  -0.03 
  Land  supply  gains  0.00 -0.01 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02  0.08 
  Allocation efficiency
gains  0.11 0.03 0.07  0.01 -0.01 0.06 0.01  0.16 0.00 0.11 0.01  0.56 
  Tariff-quota  gains  0.01 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01  -0.01 0.00 -0.04  -0.06 
  Terms of trade gains  -0.01  0.03  -0.05  -0.02  0.09  -0.13  0.05  -0.04  -0.01  -0.01  0.07  -0.02 
  Other  gains  0.02 -0.01 0.02  0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.03  0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05  -0.12 
  Total  welfare  gains  0.12 0.04 0.04  -0.01 0.08 -0.11 0.04  0.13 -0.05 0.12 0.01  0.41 
                   
Elasticities x 2  Dual labor market gains  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.04  -0.05  0.03  -0.02  0.01  -0.04  -0.12 
  Land  supply  gains  0.00 -0.02  -0.01  0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05  0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03  0.13 
  Allocation efficiency
gains  0.23 0.04 0.12  0.00 -0.01 0.13 0.02  0.30 0.01 0.16 0.02  1.02 
  Tariff-quota  gains  0.01 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01  -0.01 0.00 -0.04  -0.06 
  Terms of trade gains  0.01  0.04  -0.04  -0.03  0.08  -0.21  0.02  -0.08  -0.02  -0.02  0.05  -0.21 
  Other  gains  0.04  0.00  0.02  -0.01 -0.03 -0.09 -0.08  -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.07  -0.29 
  Total welfare gains  0.29  0.06  0.09  -0.04  0.05  -0.20  -0.05  0.22  -0.08  0.16  -0.04  0.46 
                   
Dual labor market gains  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.07  -0.02  0.03  -0.03  0.03  -0.03  -0.10  Without EU June 
2003 CAP  Land  supply  gains  0.00 -0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04  0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03  0.12 
  Allocation efficiency
gains  0.03 0.03 0.07  -0.06  -0.02 0.00 0.00  0.17 -0.03 0.12 0.00  0.31 
  Tariff-quota  gains  0.01 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01  -0.01 0.00 -0.04  -0.06 
  Terms of trade gains  0.01  0.03  -0.05  -0.05  0.08  -0.16  0.04  -0.04  -0.04  0.00  0.02  -0.15 
  Other  gains  0.34  0.00  0.02  -0.04 -0.02 -0.13 -0.06  0.00 -0.06 0.01 -0.09  -0.03 
  Total  welfare  gains  0.39 0.04 0.04  -0.14 0.04 -0.34 0.00  0.17 -0.17 0.17 -0.11  0.09 
                   
Cut in applied 
duties 
Dual labor market gains 
0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.06 -0.19  -0.01 0.01 -0.03  -0.25 
  Land  supply  gains  0.00 -0.01  -0.01  -0.08 0.00 0.05 0.07  0.06 0.01 0.01 0.04  0.13 
  Allocation efficiency
gains  0.11 0.03 0.22  0.69 0.00 0.11 0.01  -0.03 0.10 0.32 0.14  1.72 
  Tariff-quota  gains  0.00 -0.01 0.01  0.07 -0.02 0.02 -0.01  -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.05  -0.01 
  Terms of trade gains  0.01  0.05  -0.05  -0.12  0.08  -0.17  0.03  -0.06  -0.05  -0.10  -0.04  -0.42 
  Other  gains  0.05 0.00 0.07  0.36 -0.03 0.20 -0.04  -0.08 0.01 0.07 -0.05  0.55 
  Total  welfare  gains  0.18 0.06 0.24  0.91 0.04 0.23 0.00  -0.32 0.04 0.31 0.02  1.71 
                   
Excluding 
preferences 
Dual labor market gains 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.03  -0.03  0.01  -0.01  0.03  -0.02  -0.06 
  Land supply gains  0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.04  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.04  0.12 
  Allocation efficiency
gains  0.16  0.03  0.14  0.05  0.01  0.08  0.01  0.16  0.00  0.12  0.02  0.77 
  Tariff-quota gains  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  Terms of trade gains  -0.02  0.04  -0.05  -0.03  0.09  -0.11  0.07  -0.02  0.00  0.00  0.13  0.11 
  Other gains  0.04  0.00  0.04  0.05  -0.04  -0.07  -0.07  -0.02  -0.03  0.01  -0.09  -0.17 
  Total  welfare  gains  0.18 0.05 0.13  0.07 0.07 -0.11 0.02  0.15 -0.02 0.18 0.06  0.77   43 
 
Appendix IV. Elements on the structure of the model 
Supply 
Leontieff relation between value added and intermediate consumption: 
Imperfect competition: 
NBi,r (Yi,r + cfi,r) = aVAi,r VAi,r = aCNTERi,r CNTERi,r 
NBi,r PYi,r (Yi,r + cfi,r) = PVAi,r VAi,r + PCNTERi,r CNTERi,r 
Perfect competition: 
Yi,r = aVAi,r VAi,r = aCNTERi,r CNTERi,r 
PYi,r Yi,r = PVAi,r VAi,r + PCNTERi,r CNTERi,r + Pquotai,r Quotai,r 
For sectors where production quotas hold (perfect competition only): 
Yi,r = Quotai,r 
Determination of factors demand by producers results from the following optimization programs: 
Min  PVAi,rVAi,r = PLi,rLi,r + PTEi,rTEi,r + PRNi,rRNi,r + PQi,rQi,r 
s.t.: 
i VA i VA i VA i VA i VA
1
- 1
r i, r i, TE
1
- 1
r i, r i, RN
1
- 1
r i, r i, Q
1
- 1
r i, i L
1
- 1
r i, TE a RN   a Q   a L a VA σ σ σ σ σ + + + =  
and 
Min  PQi,r Qi,r = PKi,r Ki,r + PHi,r Hi,r 
s.t.: 
i CAP i CAP i CAP σ
1
- 1
r i, r i, H σ
1
- 1
r i, r i, K σ
1
- 1
r i, H a K a Q + =  
 
Comment: in the agricultural version of the model, production quotas have been introduced. For the 
associated sectors production is equal to the quota and an additional income, equal to Pquotai,r Quotai,r, is 
drawn from of the quota. 
 
Demand  
LES-CES (first stage) 
















Pr UTr = ( ) ∑
i
r i, r i, r i, cmin - C PC  
BUDCr = ∑
i
r i, r i, C PC  
PCi,r  = PDEMTOTi,r (1+taxcci,r) 
Intermediate consumption (first stage) 
















PCNTER j,r CNTER j,r = ∑
i
r j, i, r j, i,   IC   PIC  
PICi,j,r = PDEMTOTi,r (1+taxicci,j,r)   44 
 
Capital good (first stage) 
epar REVr = PINVTOTr INVTOTr 


















r i, r i, KG PKG  
PKGi,r = PDEMTOTi,r (1+taxkgci,r) 
Total demand 
DEMTOTi,r = Ci,r +∑
j
r j, i, IC + KGi,r 
Groups of regions (second stage) 
Min  PDEMTOTi,r DEMTOTi,r = PDEMUi,r DEMUi,r + PDEMVi,r DEMVi,r 
s.t.: 
i GEO i GEO i GEO
1
- 1
r i, r i, V
1
- 1
r i, r i, U
1
- 1
r i, DEMV a DEMU a DEMTOT σ σ σ + =  
 
Armington (third stage) 
Min  PDEMUi,r DEMUi,r = PDEMi,r,r DEMi,r,r + PDEMETRi,r DEMETRi,r 
s.t.: 
i ARM i ARM i ARM
1
- 1
r i, r i, ETR
1
- 1
r r, i, r i, LOC
1
- 1
r i, DEMETR a DEM a DEMU σ σ σ + =  
 
Regions (forth stage) 
For foreign regions of the same level of development: 


















PDEMETRi,s DEMETRi,s = ∑
∈Etra(s) r
s r, i, s r, i, DEM PDEM  
For foreign regions of a different level of development: 






















s r, i, s r, i, IMP
- 1
s i,
i IMP i IMP PDEM a PDEMV
σ σ  





t r, i, NB σ  
PDEMi,r,s = PDEMVARi,r,s
i VAR - 1
1
t r, i, NB σ  
 





s r, i, DEMVAR  





s r, i, DEM  (i ≠ TrT) 
YTrt,r  =∑ +
s
r s r, , TRM DEMTrT  





TRi,r,s = µi,r,s TRADEi,r,s 
MONDTR = ∑
s r, i,
s r, i, TR  
Transport supply: 









Labor allocation between agricultural and non agricultural sectors (developed countries): 















































r i, r i,








Lnar + Lar = Lbarr 
Labor market (both cases): 
PLbarr Lbarr = PLar Lar + PLnar Lnar 
Full use of endowments: 
Lar = ∑
∈Agr(i) i
r i, L  
Lnar = ∑
∉Agr(i) i
r i, L  
Hbarr =∑
i
r i, H  
Kbarr =∑
i
r i, K  
Mobility: 
PLi,r = PLar (i ∈ Agr(i)) 
PLi,r = PLnar (i ∉ Agr(i)) 
PHi,r = PHbarr 
PKi,r = PKbarr   46 
 
K and Land returns, subsidies included: 
WKi,r = PKi,r + TsubKi,r 
WTEi,r = PTEi,r + TsubTEi,r 
Land supply: 
WTEbarr TEbarr =  r i,
i
r i, TE WTE ∑  
TEbarr = TEbarOr
TEbar σ
r WTEbar   (NB: WTEbarOr = 1) 
Land allocation: 














a)  In comparison to the standard model, the agricultural version distinguishes between two types of 
unskilled labor: agricultural labor and non agricultural labor. A partial mobility between these two 
types of labors is allowed through a Constant Elasticity of Transformation supply function. Within 
each category, labor is perfectly mobile. 
b)  A duality of labor market has been assumed in developing countries: an efficiency wage scheme 
determines the level of wages in non agricultural sectors and the corresponding labor demand, and 
labor supply in agricultural sectors is computed as a residual. The efficiency wage is set such that the 
purchasing power of non agricultural wages, including tax receipts so that fiscal policy do not affect 
the results, remain unchanged after the shock. 










(1+taxPi,r) (1+TAXEXPi,r,s+taxAMFi,r,s) + µi,r,s PT  (imp. competition) 
PCIFi,r,s = PYi,r (1+taxPi,r) (1+TAXEXPi,r,s+taxAMFi,r,s) + µi,r,s PT  (perfect competition) 
Sale price: 
PDEMVARi,r,s = PCIFi,r,s (1+DDi,r,s)  (imperfect competition) 




Profits (imperfectly competitive sectors): 




- (PVAi,r VAi,r + PCNTERi,r CNTERi,r) 
Comment: in the static version of the model the computation of profits in imperfectly competitive sectors is 
replaced by a zero profit condition that determines the number of varieties in each sector through a free 
entry hypothesis. 
Tax revenues: 




  (imperfect competition) 
RECPRODi,r = taxPi,r PYi,r Yi,r  (perfect competition) 
RECEXPi,r = PYi,r (1+taxPi,r) () ∑ +
+
s s r, i,
s r, i,
s r, i, s r, i, EP 1
TRADE
) taxAMF (TAXEXP   (imp. competition) 
RECEXPi,r = PYi,r (1+taxPi,r)∑ +
s
s r, i, s r, i, s r, i, TRADE ) taxAMF (TAXEXP   (perf. competition) 
RECDDi,s =∑
r
s r, i, s r, i, s r, i, TRADE PCIF DD    47 
 
RECCONSi,r, = PDEMTOTi,r (taxcci,r Ci,r + taxkgci,r KGi,r + r j, i,
j
r j, i, IC taxicc ∑ ) 
RECTAXr =  r i, r i, r i,
i
r i, RECCONS RECDD RECEXP RECPROD + + + ∑  
Regional equilibrium: 
REVr + SOLDr =  r i, r i,
i
r i, r i, r i, r i, r i, r i, Y Pquota K PK TE PTE RN PRN + + + ∑  
+ PLbarr Lbarr + PHbarr Hbarr + RECTAXr + r s,
s
s r, rente rente − ∑  
Savings: 
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Mark-up in domestic markets: 
r r, i,
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Mark-up in foreign markets in countries with a different level of development: 
s r, i,
i C i GEO
s r, i,
i GEO i IMP i ARM i VAR i VAR
s r, i, r i, ST
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SV
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Intervention price scheme (European Union) 
 
Mode 0, no subsidy change: 
TAXEXPi,r,s = TAXEXPOi,r,s 
Mode 1: 
TAXEXPi,r,s = 0 
Mode 2, perfect competition: 
PYi,r = PInti 













s r, i, TRADE = MaxExpSubi,r 
Mode 2 or 3, or subsidy change and subsidy for at least one destination before the change: 
TAXEXPi,r,s = TAXREFi,r TAXEXPOi,r,s 
Mode 2 or 3, or subsidy change and no subsidy for all destinations before the change: 
TAXEXPi,r,s = TAXMOYi,r   48 
 
Mode 2 or 3, or subsidy change: 
TAXMOYi,r∑
≠r s
s r, i, TRADE =∑
≠r s
s r, i, s r, i, TRADE TAXEXP  
Comments: 
a)  The intervention price scheme in the EU is modeled as follows: as soon as the internal price becomes 
lower than the intervention price, the EU subsidies exports so as to raise the internal price to the level 
of the intervention price. In actual facts the EU also increases inventories, but inventories are not 
accounted for in Mirage. 
b)  In practice, the price schemes is divided into 4 possible modes: 
Mode 0:  For countries other than the EU or sectors not concerned by intervention prices, the 
subsidy rate is exogenous. 
Mode 1:  When the intervention price is lower than the internal price there is no export subsidy. 
Mode 2:  When the intervention price would be higher than the internal price the export subsidy 
rate is endogenous. The distribution across importers is the same as in the baseline. If there was 
no subsidy in the baseline this distribution is homogenous. 
Mode 3:  The subsidization of exports is limited by a maximum of subsidized exports by the 
WTO. If this limit is reached, then this constraint replaces the price constraint. 
c)  Our baseline integrates new data on export subsidy rates, which may be different from the one 
provided by the GTAP database for the year 1997. In case of such a change, the average subsidy rate 
is exogenous, and the distribution across importers remains the same as in the GTAP distribution. 
d)  When a simulation is complete, the model checks if the constraints defined a mode still hold. If they 
don’t then the mode is changed automatically until there is no more necessary change. 
 
 
List of Notations 
 
The i and j indices refer to sectors, r and s refer to regions. 
 
Parameters definition  
 
σVAj, σCAPj, σC, σIC, σKG, σGEOi, σARMi, σIMPi, σVARi Substitution  elasticities  of factors and goods demand 
cmini,r  Minimal consumption of good i in the final demand of region r 
epar  Saving rate in region r 
µi,r,s  Transport demand per volume of good 
θr  Value share of region r transport sector in the world production of 
transport 
taxpi,r, taxcci,s, taxicci,s, taxkgci,s  Tax rate applied on production, final consumption, intermediate 
consumption and capital good 
taxpi,r, taxcci,s, taxicci,s, taxkgci,s  Tax rate applied on production, final consumption, intermediate 
consumption and capital good 
taxAMFi,r,s  Export tax rate equivalent to the Multifiber Arrangement 
cfj,r  Fixed cost per unit of output in imperfectly competitive sectors 
mmoyi,r Mark-up  average 
α  Elasticity of investment to capital return rate 
δ  Depreciation rate of capital 




Yj,r  Output of sector j firms 
VAj,r Added  value 
CNTERj,r  Aggregate intermediate consumption 
Quotaj,r  Production quota when applicable 
Qj,r  Aggregate of human capital and physical capital 
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Factors 
Lj,r Unskilled  labor 
Lar  Total unskilled labor in agriculture 
Lnar  Total unskilled labor in sectors other than agriculture 
Hj,r   Skilled labor 
TEj,r Land 
RNj,r Natural  resources 
Kj,r Capital  stock 
Lbarr, Hbarr, Kbarr, TEbarr  Total supply of unskilled labor, skilled labor, capital and land 
 
Demand  
BUDCr  Budget allocated to consumption 
SOLDr  Current account balance 
UTr Utility 
Pr  Price of utility 
Ci,r Aggregated  consumption 
ICi,j,r  Intermediate consumption of good i used in the production of sector j 
INVTOTr  Total investment in region r  
KGi,r  Capital good demand of good i in region r  
DEMToti,r Total  demand 
DEMUi,r  Total demand, in region r, of good i originating from regions with the 
same development level than region r (including region r) 
DEMVi,r  Total demand, in region r, of good i originating from regions with a 
different development level than region r 
DEMETRi,r  Total demand, in region r, of good i originating from regions with the 
same development level than region r other than region r 
DEMi,r,s  Demand, in region s, of good i originating from region r 
DEMVARi,r,s  Demand, in region s, of good i produced by each firm of region r 
 
Transport 
TRADEi,r,s  Exports to region s, of industry i in region r  
TRi,r,s Transport  demand 
MONDTR Transport  aggregate 
PT  Transport of commodities price 
TRMr  Supply of international transportation by region r 
 
Monopolistic competition 
EPi,r,s Perceived  price-elasticity of total demand  
NBi,r  Number of varieties in imperfectly competitive sectors 
SEi,r,s, SUi,r,s, SVi,r,s, STi,r,s  Auxiliary variables corresponding to market share 
 
Tax Revenue 
RECPRODi,r, RECDDi,r, RECCONSi,r, RECEXPi,r Revenue16 of production tax, tariff, consumption tax, exports tax 
RECTAXr  Total tax revenue 
REVr Regional  revenue 
 
Prices and taxes 
PXXX  The generic notation « Pvar » is used to indicate the price of the variable 
« var » 
PCIFi,r,s CIF  price 
                                                 
16 Tax revenues can be negative (expenditure), because tax rates can be negative (subsidies).   50 
 
PInti  Intervention price (European Union only) 
WKi,r  Capital return rate paid to the investor 
WTEi,r  Land return rate paid to the owner 
TAXEXPi,r,s Export  tax  rate 
TAXMOYi,r  Average Export tax rate across the various destinations 
TAXREFi,r,s  Auxiliary variable to adjust TAXMOY to its proper level while keeping 
unchanged the distribution across destinations 
MaxExpSubi,r  Maximum level of subsidized exports according to WTO rules 
DDi,r,s  Ad-valorem tariff rate applied by region s on its imports from region r 
TsubKi,r  Subsidy rate on capital 
TsubTEi,r  Subsidy rate on land 
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